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I. Introduction
Looking at the United States Constitution, the Founding Fathers provided little
instruction for the implementation of public policy. Article II, Section 2 stipulated, “Congress
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”1 With the creation of this
administrative state in the later twentieth century, Congress passed laws governing its structure,
processes, and procedures. This essay examines one such law: the Hatch Act of 1939. This
federal government required an increased number of employees to run this bureaucracy. The
Hatch Act defined how these federal employees could interact with political campaigns.
Congress passed this law in 1939, at the end of the New Deal period. After the Great
Depression crippled the national economy, nearly one-third of Americans were unemployed. In
1932, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt won the presidency on the pledge that he would bring
a “new deal for the American people.”2 Roosevelt’s New Deal consisted of unprecedented
expansion of the federal government through the creation of executive agencies. To restore faith
in the market, the Roosevelt administration created the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The Agricultural Adjustment Administration
(AAA) and the National Recovery Administration (NRA) respectively regulated farm and
industry through price and competition control. Public works agencies like the Public Works
Administration (PWA) and the Works Progress Administration (WPA) developed national
infrastructure while simultaneously decreasing unemployment. The Civilian Conservation Corps
(CCC) and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) created federal conservation efforts that also
1

United States Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Paragraph 2.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, “FDR’s Democratic Nomination Acceptance Speech, July 2, 1932,” in
Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New
York: Random House, 1938), I: 647-659.
2
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helped modernize rural areas. After 1935, New Deal legislation focused more on reform than
restoration, including long-lasting laws such as the 1935 Social Security Act and the 1937
National Labor Relations Act (also known as the Wagner Act).
This paper argues that the Hatch Act of 1939 was a response to the administrative state
intended as a way to protect American constitutionalism by preserving free and fair elections.
Proponents contended this bill prevented a national spoils system which the president would use
to control electoral outcomes. Conversely, the opposition disapproved of the Hatch Act because
it restricted federal employees’ ability to participate on political campaigns. Declaring this bill a
clear violation of civil liberties, opponents compared its restrictions to foreign totalitarian
measures in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Both sides couched their arguments in relation to
preservation of the American form of government against dictatorship. This paper asserts that
fascism and totalitarianism abroad, coupled with the executive branch’s gross expansion, shaped
this debate. In historical context, Americans had no guarantee that their government would not
descend down this course. When Roosevelt performed unprecedented actions in the executive
branch, it signaled such a shift. Therefore, Congress placed restrictions like the Hatch Act on the
federal government and its employees.
Furthermore, this essay ties the Hatch Act into the greater context of New Deal legal and
legislative history. As described in the historiographical section, New Deal legal and
constitutional histories have overwhelmingly focused on President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
“court-packing” bill and the “constitutional revolution of 1937,” a period when the Supreme
Court reversed previous conservative decisions in favor of upholding New Deal legislation.
Finally, this essay argues that the Hatch Act indicated a continued constitutional opposition to
the New Deal that occurred in Congress, not just the Supreme Court.
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When studying the past, previous historical writings influence contemporary
interpretations as much as the primary sources. To support this argument, this essay analyzes the
historiography of the New Deal, the legal and constitutional transformation of the 1930s, and the
Hatch Act of 1939. Collectively, these components demonstrate how this thesis expands upon
current literature by arguing that the Hatch Act represented a constitutional backlash against the
New Deal’s administrative expansion.
This essay first examines past New Deal histories, ranging from Roosevelt administration
officials to modern historians. Upon inspection, these histories revealed interpretive
discrepancies stemming from their author’s historical context. Reviewing this historiography
demonstrates how understanding the New Deal’s successes and failures depends upon which
sources are consulted.
Next, this essay examines the constitutional and legal transformations that occurred
during the New Deal. As previously mentioned, the New Deal ushered in an era of federal
growth. This enlargement defined governance in the United States throughout the remainder of
the twentieth century. Given this importance, legal and constitutional historians dedicated texts
to describing this development’s causes and case law. Most previous works in this category have
suggested that a constitutional “revolution” occurred in 1937 because of President Roosevelt’s
“court-packing” bill. Nevertheless, recent revisionist works question the transition’s causality
and instead emphasize prolonged jurisprudential factors. These works assessed Supreme Court
litigation throughout the 1930s to illustrate how the Court and the national constitution shifted in
favor of a large federal government. Detailing this literature helps explain the constitutional and
legal environment in which the Hatch Act of 1939 came into being.
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This final historiographical section reviews the existing literature on the Hatch Act of
1939. During the late 1930s, corruption rumors stained the New Deal’s legacy as opponents
attested that Roosevelt used executive agencies to influence congressional elections. These
reports prompted Congress to pass the Hatch Act of 1939. Intended to curb “pernicious political
activities,” the Hatch Act restricted federal executive employees’ ability to participate in political
campaigns. This statute endured into the twenty-first century and still governs these interactions.
However, scholars have produced little on this litigation. Law reviews and articles generally
replaced objectivity with subjectivity and made personal evaluations about the act. The existing
monographs succeeded in describing the act’s provisions, but those texts failed to place the act in
the larger constitutional and legal context of the 1930s.
After assessing the relevant historical literature, this paper describes the workings of the
Works Progress Administration (WPA) and the scandal that ensued in Kentucky during the 1938
Democratic Party primary. This specific election scandal helped heighten attention to potential
executive branch corruption, prompting the Senate to launch a national investigation into the
issue. Through this special committee, the Senate discovered rampant political activities across
the country. The body recommended Congress pass legislation to prohibit future political
activities in elections. Congress responded with the Hatch Act of 1939. During the debate for
this bill, legislators voiced different opinions grounded in constitutional concerns. This
legislative discussion provided the evidence for conservative opposition to the New Deal and the
administrative state. Then, this text covers the Hatch Act’s remaining legal history, examining
the Supreme Court decisions that tested its constitutionality and subsequent amendments to the
law.
II. Literature Review
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A. New Deal Historiography
Even before President Roosevelt died in 1945, historians wrote accounts covering his
landmark legislative agenda. Like the American Revolution and the Civil War, different
historical schools treated this subject differently. The attitude these historians adopt towards the
New Deal depended upon the historical period in which the author wrote. This trend in New
Deal historiography exemplified the idea that historians write about and interpret the past from
the perspective of their own historical context. More importantly, Stuart Kidd argued that these
reinterpretations of the New Deal were important because they demonstrated the country’s
ability to persist through a crisis.3
A few historiographical debates surrounded the New Deal. First, historians questioned
the ideological underpinnings of the New Deal. Comparing it to previous reform movements in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they analyzed the ideological origins of the New Deal. In
this debate, past historians either viewed the New Deal as liberal or conservative.
Where early historians like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Frank Freidel, and William E. Leuchtenburg
praised the New Deal as a revolutionary advancement in American governance, the succeeding
New Left historians of the 1960s denounced it as a conservative ploy to establish corporate
dominance in the United States. More recently scholarship transcended this binary argument to
suggest that Roosevelt and the New Deal operated, and succeed, through pragmatism.
Second, historians questioned whether the New Deal succeeded at all. Where
Schlesinger Jr., and Freidel praised the program for rebuilding the national economy, New Left
historians like Howard Zinn and Ronald Radosh marked it a failure for not extending legal
protections to African Americans or abolishing the United States’ capitalist economy. Similarly,
Stuart Kidd, “Redefining the New Deal: Some Thoughts on the Political and Cultural
Perspectives of Revisionism,” Journal of American Studies 22 (Dec. 1988), 389.
3
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historians in the 1990s adopted a more moderate view by conceding both points: the New Deal
did not assist African Americans or southern tenant farmers or even fully revitalize the economy,
but it prevented additional damage, instilled economic security in the American people, and
assist oppressed interest groups.
Political actors from the 1930s and 1940s published the first New Deal histories even
before the Roosevelt administration had ended. Initially, former Roosevelt administration
members described the president and the New Deal, in a positive fashion. Robert Sherwood, a
former Roosevelt speech-writer, published a favorable recollection of the relationship between
President Roosevelt and Works Progress Administration operator Harry Hopkins.4 In his
autobiography, Harold L. Ickes, Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Interior, praised the Public Works
Administration (PWA), an early New Deal work-relief program. He lauded, “Had not Franklin
Roosevelt come along when he did with his PWA cornucopia in 1933, we might today be doing
the goose step.”5 Roosevelt’s campaign manager and later Chairman of the Democratic National
Committee, James Farley, approached hagiography in his comments. “Few, if any, can dispute
the value of such organizations as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, and the Home Owners Loan Corporation,” he acclaimed, “All must
concede the magnificence of such projects as Grand Coulee, Fort Peek, and the Tennessee
Valley. While these originated in other minds, he had the audacity to adopt them and follow
them through.”6 While their personal connections provided succeeding historians with first-hand

4

Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An intimate History (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1948).
5
Harold L. Ickes, The Autobiography of a Curmudgeon (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1943),
298.
6
James A. Farley, Jim Farley’s Story: The Roosevelt Years (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., 1948), 38. Farley pushed a similar story in his previous work Behind the
Ballots: The Personal History of a Politician (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938).
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accounts of the New Deal’s inner-workings, their affection for Roosevelt made objectivity
elusive.
The second generation of New Deal historians came with the consensus historians of the
1950s. In reaction to the progressive historian’s emphasis on class conflict and economic
struggle in United States history, these historians believed that unity and homogeneity drove
change; they stressed national character over disruptive social movements.7 In this school,
Pulitzer prize-winning historian Richard Hofstadter’s Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR (1955)
first sought to place the New Deal in the larger scheme of United States intellectual and political
history. After examining the Populist and Progressive movements of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century, he ended his analysis by comparing these trends to the New Deal. “In
the years 1933-38 the New Deal sponsored a series of legislative changes that made the
enactments of the Progressive era seem timid by comparison,” Hofstadter emphasized, “The
New Deal was different from anything that had yet happened in the United States: different
because its central problem was unlike the problems of Progressivism; different in its ideas and
spirits and its techniques.”8 Where the Progressive movement employed government action to
combat social problems such as poverty, conservation, and consumer protection, Roosevelt’s
New Deal employed government--especially the central, federal government-- to resuscitate the
national economy. Both the Progressive movement and the New Deal viewed government as the
primary agent for change, but the New Deal did so on an unprecedented scale.
The other two consensus historians were Otis Graham, Jr., and James MacGregor Burns.

Aaron D. Purcell, “Historical Interpretations of the New Deal and the Great Depression,” in
Aaron D. Purcell, ed., Interpreting American History: The New Deal and the Great Depression
(Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 2014), 13.
8
Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books,
1955), 302-304.
7
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James MacGregor Burns’ two-part Roosevelt biography dedicated one volume to his early life
and the New Deal and the second volume to World War II. This first book, Roosevelt: The Lion
and the Fox (1956), argued that Roosevelt created a “broker state” within the United States
where different politics competed for attention. In other words, the New Deal initiated an era of
interest group politics that persisted for decades.9 In An Encore for Reform: The Old
Progressives and the New Deal (1967), Otis Graham Jr., disagreed with Hofstadter. The New
Deal served as a continuation of the Progressive movement he argued.10
In United States historiography, liberal historians in the late 1950s and early 1960s
supplanted the consensus historians. These historians overwhelmingly saw the New Deal as a
liberal success, meaning popular political sentiment drove government to curb corporations and
privilege.11 For the New Deal, the three main historians included Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,
Frank Freidel, and William E. Leuchtenburg.
Any discussion of New Deal scholarship must spend significant time on Arthur M.
Schlesinger’s three-part Age of Roosevelt series.12 His first volume, The Crisis of the Old Order
(1957), began by analyzing the ideological agendas that influence the New Deal. Drawing on
the preceding two decades of United States history, the New Deal tapped into two Progressive
traditions: Theodore Roosevelt’s New Nationalism and Woodrow Wilson’s New Freedom.
Additionally, Crisis followed Roosevelt’s early years and his presidential campaigns.
9

James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York: Smithmark Books,
1956).
10
Otis Graham Jr., An Encore for Reform: The Old Progressives and the New Deal (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1967).
11
Aaron D. Purcell, “Historical Interpretations of the New Deal and the Great Depression,” 1012.
12
The three works in this series are The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933 (Boston,
Massachusetts: Mariner Books, 1957), The Coming of the New Deal, 1933-1935 (Boston,
Massachusetts: Mariner Books, 1958), and The Politics of Upheaval, 1935-1936 (Boston
Massahcusetts: Mariner Books, 1960).
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Schlesinger’s coverage of the New Deal did not begin until the second volume, The
Coming of the New Deal (1958). Here, he analyzed the political struggles involved with passing
and implementing each of these programs. Even though the National Recovery Administration
crumbled under “a mass of multifarious administrative responsibilities,” he argued it “prepared
the nation for a greater and more arduous crisis.”13 Through the Wagner Act, the New Deal
transformed the labor movement into a formidable political force. For Schlesinger, Social
Security had the greatest impact on American society. “The federal government was at last
charged with the obligation to provide its citizens a measure of protection from the hazards and
vicissitudes of life,” he wrote, “With the Social Security Act, the constitutional dedication of
federal power to the general welfare began a new phase of national history.”14
The final volume, The Politics of Upheaval, described the post-depression fragmentation
that complicated the years after 1935. “The policies which had produced the economic and
moral revival seemed themselves to be faltering. For two years the New Deal had been living off
the momentum of the Hundred Days,” he remarked, “Now the grand initiatives of 1933 appeared
to be running their course.”15 Schlesinger argues that Roosevelt held national attendance by
creating a new national coalition. “The older conception of the Democratic Party implied the
politics of organization. The new conception implied the politics of ideology.”16 This new
Democratic Party shirked the traditional party bosses and political machines to form a voting
coalition ranging from urban white progressives to African American workers. These voting
blocs carried Roosevelt to victory in the 1936 presidential election

13

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal, 176.
Ibid., 315.
15
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval, 3.
16
Ibid., 409.
14
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While these three volumes ignored the ground level impact of New Deal agencies like
TVA and WPA, they provided more information than any other study about the political context
of the New Deal. Though he planned to write five volumes on the Roosevelt presidency,
Schlesinger’s time in President John F. Kennedy’s administration limited his scholarly pursuits.
Furthermore, The Age of Roosevelt series served as a spiritual sequel to Schlesinger’s previous
work. Mirroring his Pulitzer Prize- wining study on the political changes under President
Andrew Jackson, Schlesinger contended that the New Deal represented a liberal retaliation
against the conservative business interests of the 1920s.17 This connection between the
antebellum period and the 1930s buttressed Schlesinger’s cyclical theory of history, arguing that
United States history fluctuated between periods of political conservatism and liberalism.18
Though subsequent historians critiqued this hypothesis, Schlesinger’s work remained relevant
for future discussions of the New Deal.
Roosevelt’s primary biographer, Frank Freidel treated Roosevelt as conservative but
revolutionary nonetheless. Though conceding “how basically conservative Roosevelt’s New
Deal attitudes remained during the early period of the New Deal,” Freidel later stressed, “From
the beginning of the New Deal to the end, Roosevelt functioned with a fair degree of
consistency. He heartily favored humanitarian welfare legislation and government policing of
the economy, so long as these did not dangerously unbalance the budget. He preferred
government co-operation with business to warfare with it.”19 In perspective, Freidel claimed,

17

This work is similarly titled Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston,
Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Company, 1945).
18
Schlesinger outlined this theory in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History
(Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986), 23-48.
19
Frank Freidel, The New Deal in Historical Perspective (Washington, D.C.: Service Center for
Teachers of History, 1959), 19. Freidel also adopted this view in his four-volume biographical
series on Roosevelt. He condensed this series into a single volume, Frank Freidel, Franklin D.
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“For millions of American farmers and workers, and for a large part of that businessmen, the
massive federal intervention in the economy, the planning and rationalization, and the controls
over production, prices, and wages during World War I had seemed benign.”20
Taking a step back, William E. Leuchtenburg also viewed the New Deal as
transformative, but with reservations. Leuchtenburg argued, “In 1932, men of acumen were
absorbed to an astonishing degree with such questions as prohibitions, war debts, and law
enforcement. In 1936, they were debating social security, the Wagner Act, valley authorities,
and public authorities.”21 Aside from the political subject matter, Roosevelt reshaped the
presidency by increasing its legislative capacities. The New Deal also transformed federalism.
He contended, “For the first time for many Americans, the federal government became an
institution that was directly experienced. More than state and local governments, it came to be
the government, an agency directly concerned with their welfare.”22 Nonetheless, government
assistance did not extend to everyone. Leuchtenburg acknowledged, “This was still a halfway
revolution; it swelled the ranks of the bourgeoisie but left many Americans—sharecroppers,
slum dwellers, most Negroes—outside of the new equilibrium.”23 Short and concise,
Leuchtenburg’s work provided the best overview of the New Deal period.
Nevertheless, no historian attested to the New Deal’s supposed radical nature more than
Carl N. Degler. “Almost every one of the best-known measures of the federal government
during the Depression era made inroads into the hitherto private preserves of businesses and the

Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny (Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Company,
1990).
20
Ibid., 93.
21
William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New York:
Harper Colopjon Books, 1963), 326.
22
Ibid., 331.
23
Ibid., 347.
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individual,” Degler asserted, “Furthermore, most of these new measures survived the period,
taking their places as fundamental elements in the structure of American life. For modern
Americans living under a federal government of transcendent influence and control in the
economy, this is the historic meaning of the Great Depression.”24 In his work, Degler called the
Great Depression and New Deal the “Third American Revolution,” with the American Civil War
being the second. This label stressed the importance of the New Deal as a watershed in United
States history.
During this same period, Edgar Eugene Robinson’s The Roosevelt Leadership, 19331945 (1955) first criticized FDR and the New Deal.25 Following a similar structure, Robinson
focused on FDR’s leadership style within the presidency and its outcomes on constitutionalism.
Like Leuchtenburg and Degler, he viewed the New Deal as a revolutionary transformation in
United States governance, but not for the better. “Despite winning the war and maintaining the
support of the American people, Franklin Roosevelt underwent the supreme tragedy of effective
leadership,” Robinson rebutted, “This tragedy lay not in the fact that death robbed him of
triumph. The inexorable forces of his time engulfed the world, revealing the basic weakness and
long-enduring follies that existed among the American people he had served so long.”26 This
piece’s conservative approach chided New Deal policies like Social Security for favoring welfare
legislation over “a heightened sense of individual responsibility.”27 Not only did this author
disagree with Roosevelt’s approach to the Depression, he maligned the New Deal as “injurious

24

Carl N. Degler, Out of Our Past: Forces that Shaped Modern America (New York: Harper &
Row, 1959), 417.
25
Edgar Eugene Robinson, The Roosevelt Leadership, 1932-1945 (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania:
J.B. Lippincott Company, 1955).
26
Ibid., 391.
27
Ibid., 172.
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to the slow working of democracy as Americans know it.”28 The author’s sources included
contemporary magazines such as Life and Time, detracting any credibility from his argument.
Primarily arguing in abstracts, The Roosevelt Leadership’s only important contribution to New
Deal historiography was to denote that conservative interpretations existed as early as the 1950s.
In the 1960s, a new historiographical school called the “New Left” entered the field.
Providing a stark contrast to the social conformity of the consensus historians, the New Left
arose during a period of social upheaval in the United States. The Civil Rights Movement and
antiwar movement later in the decade attempted to reshape American society by ending racial
divisions and ending ideological warfare. With this information in mind, these historians
projected their visions for contemporary society onto their descriptions of the past. Furthermore,
written during the Cold War, many of these accounts exhibited Marxist ideologies as they
chastised Roosevelt for perpetuating American capitalism.
Rejecting previous interpretations, Barton J. Bernstein contended, “The New Deal failed
to solve the problem of depression, it failed to raise the impoverished, it failed to redistribute
income, it failed to extend equality and generally countenanced racial discrimination and
segregation.”29 Comparably, in The New Deal (1967) Paul Conkin said, “The story of the New
Deal is a sad story, the ever-recurring story of what might have been.”30 William Appleman
Williams, Schlesinger’s intellectual rival, covered the intellectual dimensions of the New Deal in

28

Ibid. 392.
Barton J. Bernstein, “The New Deal: The Conservative Achievements of Liberal Reform,” in
Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History (New York: Pantheon Books,
1968), 264.
30
Paul Conkin, The New Deal (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 1967), 54.
29
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The Contours of American History. For Williams, the New Deal did not usher in a revolution,
but merely continued the Hoover administration’s corporatism.31
The most extreme author among the New Left scholarship was Marxist historian Ronald
Radosh. Where Conkin based his denouncements on the New Deal’s liberal failures, Radosh
based his argument on a perceived conservatism within the New Deal. Economically, he argued,
“It’s special form of conservatism was the development of reforms that modernized corporate
capitalism and brought corporate law to reflect the system’s changed nature.”32 To support his
claim, he noted the reactionary elements of each major New Deal policy. Social Security’s
benefits “helped maintain the existing system of production and distribution.”33 Public works
programs like the Public Works Administration and the Works Progress Administration were “of
a limited nature and did not interfere with private business prerogatives.”34 The Wagner Act’s
structure “allowed the administration to obtain the final integration of organized labor into the
existing political economy of corporation capitalism.”35 In his conclusion, Radosh delineated
from New Deal history to espouse his own political views. He bemoaned, “Understanding how
the New Deal worked will enable us to resist policies based on further extensions of the Welfare
State, and to commit ourselves instead to the collective effort to forge a socialist community in
America.”36

31

William Appleman Williams, The Contours of American History (Chicago, Illinois:
Quadrangle Paperbacks, 1961), 439-451.
32
Ronald Radosh, “The Myth of the New Deal,” in Ronald Radosh and Murray N. Rothbard, ed.,
A New History of Leviathan: Essays on the Rise of the American Corporate State (New York:
E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1972),
33
Ibid., 159.
34
Ibid., 170.
35
Ibid., 173.
36
Ibid., 187.
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Radosh’s article exemplified the critical problems with the entire New Left historical
school. Ironically, famed New Left historian Howard Zinn described this problem with his
school. Historians, in his view, were to subject the past to modern criticisms. “It is for today,”
he wrote, “that we turn to the think of the New Deal period.”37 Like Radosh, Zinn discredited
the New Deal for not bringing “the blessings of immense natural wealth and staggering
productive potential to every person in the land” or teaching ordinary people “how to
communicate the day-to-day pains felt, between emergencies.”38 Rebuking New Left arguments,
Jerold S. Auerbach asserted, “The New Left critique of the New Deal—spirited, controversial,
and provocative though it may be—is occasionally illogical and consistently ahistorical.”39 In
the stream of New Deal historiography, the New Left’s contribution was that it contested the
consensus historians’ assumption that the New Deal radically altered the nation based on liberal
principles and that it questioned the notion that the New Deal was the driving force behind the
economic rehabilitation.
The New Left school declined as the social movements of the 1960s faded. In the 1970s
and the 1980s, New Deal scholarship adopted a new, more diverse form. Whereas earlier
scholarship viewed the program from a top-down approach, these new studies dissected
individual programs and their impacts upon various social groups. “This emergent consensus
has not, however, so much ended controversy over the New Deal as transformed the terms of the
debate,” John Braeman wrote, “The more recent monographic literature on the New Deal, while
admitting its limited aims and even more limited successes, puts the New Deal in juster
37

Howard Zinn, The Politics of History (Chicago, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1970).
Zinn dedicated an entire book to this subject in Howard Zinn, ed., New Deal Thought (New
York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966).
38
Zinn, The Politics of History, 119.
39
Jerold S. Auerbach, “New Deal, Old Deal, or Raw Deal: Some Thoughts on New Left
Historiography,” Journal of Southern History 35 (Feb.1969), 27.
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perspective by showing its positive achievements in humanizing and disciplining American
capitalism, the novelty and complexity of the problems that the Roosevelt administration faced,
the difficulties of shaping policy in a pluralistic democracy, the continuing appeal of traditional
values and attitudes, and the strength—diminished, but not destroyed—of private interest
groups.”40 Furthermore, historians incorporated disciplines such as sociology and anthropology
into these accounts.41
During this time, James T. Patterson’s work illustrated the political complications during
the New Deal period. In The New Deal and the States: Federalism in Transition (1969),
Patterson confronted United States historians’ bias to focus solely on the federal government.
He contended that the federal government did not uniformly impose its agenda on receptive state
governments. Instead, state actors contested these programs and impacted the success they
achieved on the state level. Nonetheless, this period still witnessed a transition towards topdown governance that marked federalism until the 1980s. “Compared to the national
government, the states lost authority in the 1930s—and they have regained very little since. But
their loss was not the fault of Roosevelt, [Harry] Hopkins, or [James] Farley, or the most
nationalistic ideologues of the New Deal,” he wrote, “They have slipped—relatively—because
the states alone, for good or ill, lacked the potential to solve the problems of urban, mid-

John Braeman, “The New Deal and the ‘Broker State:” A Review of the Recent Scholarly
Literature,” The Business History Review 46 (Winter, 1972), 410. Braeman says these
monographs included John A. Brennan’s Silver and the New Deal (1969), Michael E. Parrish’s
Securities Regulation and the New Deal (1970), Daniel S. Hirshfield’s The Lost Reform: The
Campaign for Compulsory Health Insurance in the United States from 1932 to 1943 (1970),
Thomas K. McGraw’s TVA and the Power Fight, 1933-1939 (1971), and Raymond Wolters’
Negroes and the Great Depression: The Problem of Economic Recovery (1971).
41
Purcell, “Historical Interpretations of the Great Depression and the New Deal,” 21.
40
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twentieth century America.”42 Similarly, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The
Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-1939 (1967) emphasized the role the
conservative opposition played in bringing the New Deal to a close.43
As the gap between the New Deal and the present widened, historians who did compose
general histories gave the policies a balanced approached. The most recent—and arguably most
objective—examination of the New Deal was David M. Kennedy’s Freedom From Fear: The
American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 (1999).44 Where early liberal
interpretations hailed nearly all New Deal programs as instant successes and New Left historians
condemned the New Deal for merely preserving the existing capitalist structure, Kennedy
recognized the New Deal’s successes and failures. The New Deal did not stabilize the national
economy as original historians thought, it only prevented further damage. Full economic return
did not occur until the United States entered World War II. “When the war brought recovery at
last, a recovery that inaugurated the most prosperous quarter century America has ever know, it
brought it to an economy and a country that the New Deal had fundamentally altered.”45 With
this in mind, the New Deal’s true achievement was not economic recovery. Kennedy argued,
“Above all, the New Deal gave to countless Americans who had never had much of it a sense of
security, and with it a sense of having a stake in their country. And it did it all without shredding
the American Constitution or sundering the American people. At a time when despair and
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alienation were prostrating other peoples under the heel of dictatorship, that was no small
accomplishment.”46
During the administration of President William Clinton in the 1990s, scholars perceived
this presidency as a revival in liberalism. Historians in this context used this opportunity to
examine the past through the context of liberal development. Alan Brinkley viewed the New
Deal’s impact on this ideological strand in American history. Beginning his analysis in 1937
with the onset of a second economic downturn in the country—which some called the
“Roosevelt recession,” Brinkley argued this event allowed liberal “New Dealers” like Tom
Cocoran, Thurman Arnold, and Benjamin Cohen to exert influence within the administration.
“The importance of the New Deal lies in large part, of course, in the actual legislative and
institutional achievements: the Social Security System, the Wagner Act, the TVA, the farm
subsidy programs, the regulation of wages and hours . . . and others—achievements that together
transformed the federal government and its relationship to the economy and to the American
people,” wrote Brinkley, “But the New Deal’s significance lies as will in its impact on
subsequent generations of liberals and, through them, on two decades of postwar government
activism. And in that light, the New Deal appears not just as a bright moment in which reform
energies briefly prevailed but as part of a long process of ideological adaptation.”47 For
Brinkley, the New Deal set the bar for liberals like Lyndon B. Johnson and Clinton later in the
twentieth century.
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Likewise, Alonzo L. Hamby’s ideological study recognized the New Deal’s overall
failure to mend the national economy.48 “Although he failed to achieve many of his most
important immediate objectives, although he was notoriously eclectic and nonsystematic in his
approach to the enormous problems of his era, FDR was the founder of a distinctly new tradition
which was to preempt the mainstream of American politics after his death.”49 Theodore
Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson’s progressivism influenced this new tradition and its dedication
to securing individual liberty through federal intervention. Hamby reasoned that this tradition
continued into the twentieth century until President Ronald Reagan warned, “Government is not
the solution to our problem. Government is the problem.” In this sense, Reagan was the
“Roosevelt of the right.”50
Recently scholarship began to place the New Deal and its key participants in an
international context. In his award-winning work, Ira Katznelson extended his parameters past
the traditionally viewed New Deal end date of 1943 to the end of the Truman administration in
1950. Similar to Kennedy’s emphasis on security, Katznelson emphasized the role of fear in
New Deal politics. Nothing guaranteed that the United States would recover after the Great
Depression. This crisis made Americans uncertain about their futures; some even questioned
whether the liberal democracy enshrined in the Constitution could recover without drastic
measures. This unpredictability correlated with the rise of fascism and dictatorship abroad. In
context, Roosevelt’s drastic increase of federal power resembled those taken in 1930s Germany
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and Italy.51 Likewise, David Roll’s The Hopkins Touch (2013) examined the role Works
Progress Administrator Harry Hopkins played domestically as both a works relief administrator
and internationally as a diplomat.52
Interestingly, the late-twentieth century and early twenty-first century ushered in a new
body of New Deal literature geared towards general audiences. In biographies, Jean Edward
Smith’s FDR (2005) and Kenneth S. Davis’ multi-volume series exemplified this trend.
Appealing to a larger, less educated audience, these texts provided only cursory accounts of the
New Deal period; some even bordered on hagiography, ignoring Roosevelt’s extramarital affair
and attributing the entire success of the New Deal to the president.53
In summary, the historical context in which authors wrote about the New Deal shaped
how they wrote about it. The individuals who served in the Roosevelt administration wrote
favorable accounts of the agenda they helped devise and implement. Consensus historians
examined unity as the driving force behind the New Deal. Those in the 1960s New Left
historians criticized the New Deal for failing to attain the achievements contemporary social
movements sought to bring about. Finally, late-twentieth century historians approached the New
Deal from bottom-up and international perspectives.
B. The Constitutional and Legal History of the New Deal
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“Work in legal history has tended to focus too much on courts, and with unfortunate
limitations even within that range,” lamented legal historian James Willard Hurst.54 This
description applied to New Deal history up to the twenty-first century. The New Deal’s limited
legal history almost exclusively focused on Supreme Court litigation invalidating key statutes
and the subsequent constitutional crisis that ensued after President Franklin D. Roosevelt
introduced his court-packing bill in 1937. This thesis seeks to extend the scope of New Deal
legal history past the Court to include a legislative act passed in direct response to the
bureaucratic growth of the early 1930s.
Within New Deal constitutional and legal historiography, numerous texts cover the
“constitutional revolution” that occurred during the Roosevelt administration. William E.
Leuchtenburg’s The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of
Roosevelt (1996) provided the traditional narrative for the “constitutional revolution.”55 Once
President Roosevelt had implemented New Deal policies geared towards recovering and
reforming the national economy, the Supreme Court reviewed this legislation. From 1935 to
1937, the Court invalidated key pieces of the New Deal. Through Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan
(1935) and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935), the Court overturned the
National Recovery Administration as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.56 In
United States v. Butler (1936) the Court invalidated the Agricultural Adjustment
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Administration’s processing tax for violating the Tenth Amendment.57 Roosevelt claimed the
Court subjected the nation to a “horse and buggy” interpretation of interstate commerce that
hampered federal involvement. Using his electoral mandate after the Democratic Party’s sweep
in the 1936 elections, Roosevelt introduced a bill to increase the number of justices on the
Supreme Court. This opportunity would allow him to “pack” the Court with justices predisposed
to rule in favor of his policies.
Even though Congress rejected the “court-packing” bill, the intended effect still occurred.
Beginning in 1937, the Court’s rulings on New Deal legislation ruled in the administration’s
favor. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937) first signified the Court’s new jurisprudence.58 In
Parrish, the Court overturned precedents set in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923) and
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo (1936) by upholding minimum wage legislation in
Washington.59 In Helvering v. Davis (1937) and Steward Machine Co. v. Davis (1937), the
Court sustained the Social Security Act of 1935.60 Finally, National Labor Relations Board v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation (1937) upheld the National Labor Relations Act of 1935
and solidified labor’s right to collectively organize.61 After 1937, the Court ruled in favor of
every New Deal policy.
Leuchtenburg attributed this revolutionary transformation to either the “court-packing”
bill’s constitutional implications—meaning an infringement on the Constitution’s separation-ofpowers system—or Roosevelt’s mandate in the 1936 election. Specifically, this conventional
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narrative looked at the voting behaviors of Justice Owen J. Roberts and Chief Justice Charles
Evan Hughes. Once Roosevelt introduced the bill, these moderate justices had no choice but to
rule with the liberal bloc of the Court in order to sustain institutional integrity.62 The fear that
Roosevelt’s bill jeopardized the Court’s independence drove them to carry out this swift
response; this quick break from precedent led historians like Leuchtenburg to label the
transformation a “revolution.”
Other scholars questioned this theory. In his study of antebellum American law, Morton
J. Horwitz wrote, “Constitutional law in America represents episodic legal intervention
buttressed by rhetorical tradition that is often an unreliable guide to the slower (and often more
unconscious) process of legal change in America.”63 His assessment proved equally applicable
to constitutional changes in the New Deal era. In recent years, legal historians revisited the
“constitutional revolution” and the conventional narrative that Roosevelt’s “court-packing” plan
ushered in this transformation. Two histories, Barry Cushman’s Rethinking the New Deal Court:
The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution (1999) and G. Edward White’s The Constitution
and the New Deal (2000), gave the revolution a more realistic approach. 64
First, Cushman’s Rethinking the New Deal Court began with a rejection of the
conventional narrative. Using primary sources, he deduced that the “court-packing” bill could
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not have caused the “constitutional revolution.” In reality, the Court decided Parrish, arguably
the seminal case in the “constitutional revolution,” at the end of their 1936 session; they delayed
the case to the following year because Justice Harlan Fiske Stone was ill. Additionally, this
author argued that it was unlikely that Roosevelt’s 1936 mandate pressured the Court to change
because he had already possessed this authority after the 1934 congressional elections.
Cushman’s analysis continued by establishing a different hypothesis for the
“constitutional revolution.” For Cushman, the jurisprudential transformation belonged in the
larger conversation about government regulation and interstate commerce. In his argument, the
1934 case Nebbia v. New York represented a shift in constitutional jurisprudence that predated
the “court-packing” bill.65 In Nebbia, the Court abandoned the “public-private” distinction it had
long employed to determine regulatory commerce clause cases. From here, the Court rejected
the NRA and AAA because they were poorly-written. After 1937, when the Court upheld New
Deal legislation, they did so because it better fit constitutional precedent. Therefore, the justices
were not responding to the “court-packing” bill, they were deciding cases based on what best fit
precedent. Likewise, the Court did not fully transform until Roosevelt nominated his own
appointees. This “Roosevelt Court” further extended commerce clause case law in United States
v. Darby (1941), which allowed Congress to outlaw child labor, and Wickard v. Filburn (1942),
which allowed Congress to regulate commerce even when it lay outside interstate commerce. 66
Comparatively, White’s The Constitution and the New Deal expanded Cushman’s scope
and compared this supposed constitutional revolution to larger shifts in legal history. Assessing
developments in foreign relations, civil liberties, and administrative law, White argued that the
constitutional and legal changes that occurred under the New Deal belonged to a larger part of
65
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jurisprudential shifts. His study argued, “The crisis was underway by the early 1920s and not
fully resolved until after the Second World War, so neither its surfacing nor its resolution can be
attributed solely to developments in the New Deal period.”67 His overarching thesis was that
future historians should “cabin” the New Deal in its own time because these constitutional and
legal changes did not begin or end with the New Deal.
Appeasing Hurst’s qualm that legal history too often examines Supreme Court cases and
justices only, Peter Irons’ The New Deal Lawyers (1982) investigated the lawyers who staffed
the New Deal agencies and defended these policies in the courtroom.68 Narrowing his research
down to three agencies, the National Recovery Administration, the Agricultural Adjustment
Agency, and the National Labor Relations Board, Irons identified three distinct litigation
strategies that shaped how these programs fared before the Supreme Court. Executive branch
conflict, poorly-trained lawyers, and clashing political interests hindered the NRA’s “Legal
Politicians.” These setbacks prevented them from finding a workable litigation strategy, and
eventually caused them to select a weak test case to take to the Court. Lofty goals limited the
AAA’s “Legal Reformers.” Jerome Frank and his counsel desired to use their position to assist
poor tenant farmers and sharecroppers in the South. Their ambition led to their defeat as they
overextended their roles and failed to select a test case that matched administration’s interests.
Irons praised the “Legal Craftsmen” of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). As the
name implied, these lawyers, trained in Ivy League schools, meticulously drafted and
implemented the Wagner Act. To verify the act’s constitutionality in Court, they finely selected
five test cases that supported their argument. These combined efforts led the Court to uphold all
aspects of the NLRB. Conclusively, Irons argued that the conflicts in the NRA and AAA
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resulted in poorly-written law. Focusing less on the constitutional “revolution” explanation,
Irons attributed the Court’s switch to this “poor craftsmen” theory.”
Whether or not the “constitutional revolution” occurred because of the “court-packing”
bill or a shift in legal jurisprudence, these accounts share similar features. Even when legal
historians like Irons departed from the orthodoxy of court histories, their analysis still focused on
the “constitutional revolution” of 1937. Though Irons examined a legal actor other than judges,
his works still remained in the courtroom. With this literature in mind, this thesis seeks to
examine a federal law, the Hatch Act of 1939, that resulted because of the New Deal’s expansive
administrative growth.
C. Hatch Act Historiography
In his biographical sketch of New Mexico Senator Carl Hatch (D), historian David Porter
stated, “Surprisingly, historians have not devoted entire works or many chapters to the original
Hatch Act.”69 When New Deal historians wrote about the Hatch Act, usually, they only granted
it a few lines when discussing possible political interference in the 1938 midterm elections. This
thesis seeks to amend this problem by connecting the Hatch Act with constitutional context of
the New Deal era.
The bulk of literature pertaining to the Hatch Act of 1939 comes from law reviews.
Generally, these pieces are similarly structured in that they begin with a brief history of the act’s
passage and then discuss its constitutionality.70 Much of Hatch Act scholarship arose during the

David Porter, “Senator Carl Hatch and the Hatch Act of 1939,” New Mexico Historical Review
48 (1973), 151.
70
Philip L. Martin, “The Constitutionality of the Hatch Act: Second Class Citizenship for Public
Employees,” University of Toledo Law Review 6 (1974): 78-109; Robert G. Vaughn,
“Restrictions on the Political Activities of Public Employees: The Hatch Act and Beyond,”
George Washington Law Review 44 (1976): 516-553.
69

Myers 28
1970s either before or after the Court debated the constitutionality of the act in 1973.71 Bearing
this point in mind, these authors ended their arguments by making a policy recommendation in
regard to the Hatch Act (usually calling for the Court to overturn the law). While these pieces
did provide different viewpoints on the act, most lacked any relevance to historical scholarship.
Along these same lines, Delmer Gibson Rhodes’ M.A. thesis chronicled the Hatch Act’s
constitutional history from its inception to the 1970s.72 This author detailed the provisions
within the law and chronicled the federal cases that tested this law’s constitutionality. This thesis
suffered from the same criticism as the relevant law reviews in that it also provided a personal
evaluation of the law, avoiding a objective assessment. While this text would be useful in
determining the constitutionality of the law, for historical study, it provided little. However, this
literature was the only text to trace the Hatch Act’s litigation history, making it a useful resource
in this field.
The only monograph covering the Hatch Act of 1939 was James R. Eccles’ The Hatch
Act and the American Bureaucracy (1981).73 First, like the other literature on this subject, this
author imposed his opinion about the law throughout the book, suggesting it infringed upon
governmental employees’ freedom of speech. Second, the author failed to use many secondary
sources in his analysis, disconnecting this text from the existing historical literature on the New
Deal and the period’s legal changes.
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Nevertheless, this work’s highlight was its implementation of primary sources. From
congressional floor debates to the committee hearings, Eccles research provided future
investigators with a wealth of resources to expand upon the Hatch Act.
The most well-developed writing on the Hatch Act came from Jason Scott Smith’s
Building New Deal Liberalism: The Political Economy of Public Works, 1933-1956 (2006).74
Using the 1938 Democratic primary in Kentucky to investigate political corruption under New
Deal public works agencies, Smith connected this election and others like it to the passage of the
Hatch Act of 1939. Where Building New Deal Liberalism fell short—and where this thesis will
build upon—was the constitutional importance of the Hatch Act. For Smith, the Hatch Act
served merely as a retaliation against corruption in public works projects; he did not extend this
hypothesis to the entire New Deal expansion. Yet Smith’s work surpassed other Hatch Act
literature in that it refrained from making a personal evaluation of the act.
III. The WPA
Throughout the Great Depression, one of the greatest challenges for government officials
was lowering the unemployment rate and returning Americans to the workplace. When
Roosevelt assumed the presidency in 1933, government data estimated the unemployment rate at
approximately 33% of the total work force in the United States.75 Aside from sedating the
domestic economy, gross unemployment demoralized the national temperament and caused
some to question democracy and liberal capitalism’s sustainability.76
To rectify this joblessness, Roosevelt created work relief programs to put Americans
back to work. Initial agencies like the Civilian Conservation Corps and the Public Works
74

Jason Scott Smith, Building New Deal Liberalism: The Political Economy of Public Works,
1933-1956 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
75
Kennedy, Freedom From Fear, 163.
76
Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself

Myers 30
Administration were unable to tackle large-scale unemployment and large-scale construction
projects. On April 8, 1935, Congress appropriated nearly $5 billion to fund work relief projects
with the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act. Injecting new money into previous work relief
programs like the PWA, it also supplied the financial support to create a larger national work
relief program. One month later, on May 6, Roosevelt signed the WPA into creation.77
Overtime, the WPA became the largest federal work relief program implemented to
tackle national unemployment. Its hierarchy created an organized system for the federal
government to approve work projects. The program divided every state into multiple districts
with its own WPA office (Kentucky, for example, had six districts). Each state had its own
administrator who oversaw office operations. Above these officials, regional directors
communicated with the top-level officials in the WPA. At the top, the chief executive directed
the entire policy for the agency; the most notable head of the WPA was Harry Hopkins. When a
city or state saw the need for a new construction project, the request worked its way through this
hierarchy and bureaucracy until the federal administration approved. Moreover, because it had
appropriated the funds for the entire agency, Congress generated a list of acceptable options. 78
However, from its inception, the WPA attracted unwanted political attention. PulitzerPrize winning historian David M. Kennedy commented, “The WPA was from the outset a
magnet for controversy. It was a federal program, but one that recognized the timeworn
principle that ‘all politics is local.’ Roosevelt used it to build up those local bosses who would,
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in turn, support his national programs.”79 As early as 1935, opponents of the New Deal in
Kentucky charged the WPA with political activities during election season. During the state’s
gubernatorial election, Republicans working for party nominee King Swope charged the WPA
with political involvement. Hoping to discredit Roosevelt and the New Deal, they alleged that
the national arm of the WPA funneled forty-two million dollars into Kentucky to buy 72,000
votes for the Democratic candidate, A.B. “Happy” Chandler.80
At its peak in September 1938, the Kentucky WPA employed seventy-two thousand
Kentuckians. Specific projects included an administrative office for Louisville’s Bowman Field
airport, a new city hall in Pineville, and an improved school for Morgan County. Across the
state, the WPA created “sewing rooms” for local women to make clothes for needy families.
The agency created and staffed recreation centers in nearly every county in the state. When the
Ohio River flooded in 1937, WPA workers helped repair the damages in downtown Louisville.81
Famously, the WPA hired Kentucky women to traverse rural regions in Eastern Kentucky and
lend books in a “packhorse library.”82
Throughout the 1930s, the WPA had combated unemployment in Kentucky and across
the nation, mitigating the effects of the Great Depression. When Roosevelt ended the program in
1943, the Kentucky headquarters in downtown Louisville had processed over $162 million
spread out over thousands of projects.83 Nationally, over its eight years, it employed 8.5 million
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people for $11 billion.84 If any agency symbolized the New Deal’s unprecedented governmental
expansion, it was the WPA.
IV. The 1938 Kentucky Democratic Primary Scandal
In hindsight, 1938 marked a transitional period for both the world and the United States.
In January, the Sino-Japanese conflict witnessed one of its bloodiest incidents with the Nanking
Massacre under Emperor Hirohito. On March 12, Adolf Hitler’s Germany annexed neighboring
Austria in the Anschluss. Elsewhere, the Italian fascists under Benito Mussolini continued to
wage war in Ethiopia. Across the globe, totalitarian states expanded their boundaries and
asserted international dominance. Nearly a year later, this aggression led to the start of World
War II when Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939.
In the United States, by 1938, support for the New Deal among the public and in
Congress waned. Two political issues the previous year compromised President Roosevelt’s
governing coalition. First, a brief economic recession threatened to plunge the country back into
the depression. As unemployment decreased and GDP increased in early 1937, Roosevelt sought
to balance the budget by reducing federal expenditures. In turn, an economic relapse—dubbed
the “Roosevelt recession”—occurred in the fall and winter.85 Second, President Roosevelt’s
“court-packing” bill decreased presidential popularity. After the Supreme Court invalidated the
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933,
Roosevelt feared the conservative justices on the Court restricted the nation to a “horse-andbuggy” definition of the commerce clause. Using the electoral mandate he achieved in the 1936
election, Roosevelt revealed a judiciary bill allowing the president to appoint six new justices to
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the Supreme Court (using their old age as justification). The American public and congressional
members from both parties recognized this bill as a response to previous anti-New Deal
decisions and a potential risk to the constitutional system of checks and balances.86
It was in this historical context, with an executive branch in control of an expanded relief
system that was declining in popularity, that the 1938 Kentucky Democratic Primary occurred.
Two factors attracted national attention to this party primary race. First, the candidates were two
key figures in Kentucky state politics. The 1938 Democratic primary pitted Senate Majority
Leader Alben W. Barkley against Govern A.B. “Happy” Chandler. Second, the claims of
political corruption heightened anti-government sentiment. Both sides hurled accusations that
the other utilized government workers and funds to sway the elections. This essay recounts both
politicians’ backstories and then delves into the rumors of political corruption.
Born in Graves County, Kentucky, Alben William Barkley became the Kentucky Senator
most closely associated with the New Deal and the Roosevelt administration. Spanning nearly
five decades, his political career ranges from local offices to the vice-presidency. After
completing his legal education at the University of Virginia, Barkley’s first venture into local
Kentucky politics occurred when he ran to become McCracken County’s county attorney in
1904. Winning this election, he went on to become the county judge in 1909. Three years later,
in 1912, he first entered Congress as the Representative for Kentucky’s First District. There, he
became a proponent of President Woodrow Wilson’s New Freedom, advocating for increased
restrictions on monopolies and government regulation of the market. Gaining popularity in the
House, he became a candidate in Kentucky’s 1923 gubernatorial Democratic primary. Losing
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the nomination to James Campbell Cantrill, he increased his standing in the party by backing this
ticket in the general election. Retaining his seat in the House, Barkley transitioned to the Senate
in 1926. As a harsh critic of President Herbert Hoover’s approach to the economic depression,
Barkley used his popularity to campaign for Roosevelt during his presidential campaign in 1932.
Roosevelt awarded this association by endorsing Barkley for Senate Majority Leader 1936 when
the incumbent, Joseph Robinson, passed away. Across all of these positions, Barkley employed
the oratory skills he had developed as a schoolchild to enunciate on his ideological positions.87
Barkley’s rival, Albert Benjamin “Happy” Chandler, also possessed an extensive record
in Kentucky state politics before and after the 1938 primary. A Henderson County native, his
peers at Transylvania University gave him his nickname, “Happy,” for his outgoing and
energetic personality.88 Beginning in the Lexington political scene, he became a state senator
from Woodford County in 1929. By the age of thirty-seven, he had served as a state senator,
lieutenant governor, and governor; later, he went on to serve as a United States senator, a second
term as governor, and baseball commissioner. In 1935, Chandler defeated Thomas Rhea in the
Democratic gubernatorial primary. In the subsequent general election, Chandler partook in the
national Democratic sweep as he trounced Republican candidate King Swope. During his
tenure, he replaced the two-primary system with a single primary system, abolished the sales tax
implemented by former Governor Ruby Laffoon, and increased liquor and cigarette taxes.89
For these two Kentucky political giants, the 1938 Democratic primary became the race of
a lifetime. Recounting his political career in his autobiography, Barkley described the 1938
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primary as “the only year in which I had serious opposition for renomination.”90 Similarly, in an
interview later in his life, Chandler relayed his perception of the primary. He envisioned his
1938 campaign as a battle against Barkley, Roosevelt, and the federal treasury. Chandler
described his relationship with Roosevelt, “I never got along well with Roosevelt. He did some
good things, but he did some bad things too.”91
Given Chandler’s quick ascension in Kentucky politics, Barkley feared Chandler would
challenge him in his 1938 reelection. Chandler confirmed these suspicions on January 22, 1938,
when he refused to attend a testimonial dinner celebrating Barkley’s promotion to Senate
Majority Leader. Moreover, Chandler held his own function on the same date, inviting
government officials from across the state.92 He announced his Senate bid on February 23 in
Newport, Kentucky. Touting his own state record, he offered himself as a “man of action to
replace a man of words.” In his speech, he played upon Barkley’s connection to Roosevelt and
claimed the Senator had given Kentucky the “absent treatment.” Urging Kentuckians to stand by
him one more time, Chandler was “absolutely certain of victory.”93
The corruption scandal began in the summer in late May 1938. On May 27, Brady
Stewart, Chandler’s campaign manager, published a letter claiming that “every federal relief
agency in Kentucky is frankly and brazenly operating on a political basis.” George Goodman,
Kentucky WPA director, rebuked these accusations in the Courier Journal. One particular
rumor alleged that the WPA distributed groceries and commodities to needy Kentuckians in
90
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paper bags inscribed “donated by a friend of Senator Alben W. Barkley.” The campaign
defended that these items came from an unnamed benefactor outside the administration.94 On
June 29, Hopkins released the results of an internal WPA investigation in Kentucky. Finding
twenty-two alleged instances of political activities in the state, Hopkins rebutted all but two. But
after the election, Ernest Rowe, the former WPA supervisor for the Lexington district, leaked
correspondence purporting that George Goodman pressured Kentucky agency officials to
contribute funds to Barkley’s campaign.95 Goodman provided no comment on these
allegations.96
Chandler employed similar tactics using state government employees. With the help of
campaign official Dan Talbott, Chandler’s patronage rested primarily on the state highway
program. During the primary, he increased hirings to gain more votes. The agency also
dispatched letters promising “to build roads where they are appreciated and where we can
accommodate those who are loyal, tried, and true.” Similarly, the Chandler campaign used state
workers to deliver old age pension checks to elderly Kentuckians, in some cases refusing to grant
the check if they refused to vote for the governor.97
On July 8, 1938, in the midst of campaigning, Roosevelt traveled to Kentucky. At his
first stop in Covington, the president rebutted the claims against federal corruption by recounting
the New Deal’s numerous successes.98 Citing new federal expenditures, matched traditional
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funds for state projects, avoiding mass liquidation through the Home Owners Loan Corporation
and the Farm Credit Administration, and federal assistance against flood damages, he argued that
New Deal policies had a direct, positive impact on Kentuckians. Roosevelt alleged, “If the
Federal Government, your government, had not done at least some of these things, the state
governments would probably not have done them at all out of their own resources, because they
could not.”99 After this claim, he then proceeded to discuss the upcoming state primary. “I read
in the papers that you are having a primary campaign in Kentucky,” he noted, “Both candidates I
know. Both are men of ability. Both are representative Kentuckians. I want to make it definite
and clear to you that I am not interfering in any shape, manner or form in the primary campaign
in Kentucky. I do not live here—you do.” Minutes later, he contradicted this position by
attesting to Barkley’s experience. “I have no doubt whatsoever that Governor Chandler would
make a good Senator from Kentucky—but I think that my friend, the Governor, would be the
first to acknowledge . . . it would take many years to match the national knowledge, the
experience, and acknowledged leadership in the affairs of the Nation of that son of Kentucky, of
whom the whole nation is proud, Alben Barkley.”100 During this part, Chandler, according to
Barkley, smiled, waved, and called out to the crowd to distract them from Roosevelt’s
endorsement.101
In conclusion, he dismissed the claims that state and federal government officials utilized
their positions and resources to persuade voters. He stated:
You have heard charges and the country has heard charges of the use of political
influence exerted on primary voters. Charges have been bandied back and forth that
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employees of the Federal Government and workers on relief are being directed how to
vote. And we have all heard charges that state employees, people the state payroll and
their friends are being directed how to vote. Let me assure you that it is contrary to direct
and forceful orders from Washington, for any Federal Government employee to tell those
under them how to vote and I trust that the same rule applies to those who work for or
under the State of Kentucky.
Personally, I am not greatly disturbed by these stories because I have an oldfashioned idea, an old-fashioned faith, that the voters of Kentucky, no matter whom they
employ or by whom they are employed, are going to voter their own personal convictions
on Primary Day. That is as it should be.
However, later that same day, Roosevelt adopted a much more direct stance for whom
Kentucky voters should cast their ballots. In Louisville, the president praised the city’s resilience
in recovering from flooding along the Ohio River the previous year, saying, “I want to
congratulate you and also the citizens of other communities who suffered so greatly from that
flood on the firm courage and the fine spirit with which you met that disaster.”102 To further
ameliorate this damage, he pledged future federal assistance from executive agencies like the
WPA, Public Health Service, and Army Engineers. Aside from this promise, Roosevelt
concluded these remarks with an appeal to his favored candidate. He continued, “In this work of
planning and coordinating work on a vast scale, I want to acknowledge the splendid assistance I
have received from the senior Senator from Kentucky,” he praised, “This is a national problem.
We need people of national experience with a national point of work to carry it out.”103
Roosevelt’s endorsement of Barkley belonged to a larger historical trend that occurred in
Democratic primaries across the country. Seeking to purge the Democratic Party of conservative
legislators hostile to the New Deal, the president endorsed and assisted candidates who sided
with him ideologically. In South Carolina, he allowed Governor Olin Johnston to announce
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against conservative incumbent Senator Ellison “Cotton Ed” Smith on the White House steps.
At a public rally in Georgia, he challenged Senator Walter F. George by stating that—if
possible—he would “most assuredly” cast his vote for pro-New Deal challenger Lawrence
Camp. Likewise, he endorsed Maryland candidate Representative David J. Lewis against Senator
Millard Tydings, claiming the incumbent had “betrayed the New Deal in the past and will
again.”104 This purge proved unsuccessful as all of the conservative Democratic incumbents
defeated the challengers Roosevelt had endorsed.
Despite his insistence to campaign on behalf of political candidates, it is unknown if
Roosevelt or members of his executive cabinet knew about these actions. Robert E. Sherwood,
one of Roosevelt’s speechwriters, described Harry Hopkins response to the Kentucky
controversy. “Just as post-office employees had been used time immemorial to beat the bushes
in behalf of the ‘right’ candidates, so it was inevitable that local politicians all over the country
would find ways and means of taking advantage of the vast WPA organizations,” Sherwood
wrote, “Hopkins hated these activities, but he most certainly knew about them and made only
occasional attempts to stop them, and to that extent he was culpable.”105 In his autobiography,
James A. Farley, Roosevelt’s 1932 campaign manager and later Chairman of the Democratic
National Convention, also addressed these claims: “It seems to me that the administration of
WPA and PWA has been remarkably free from the blight of partisanship and politics. It would
be idle to deny that overzealous individuals in some communities have tried to obtain partisan
advantage out of relief activities, but that is a far cry from endeavoring to prove that the entire
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Federal set-up has been shot through with corruption and favoritism.” Moreover, he further
defended Hopkins and the WPA by attesting that he has “never been identified with Democratic
politics” and that agency’s social workers “by long training and environment are hostile to
political control of any kind.”106
In the final count, Barkley defeated Chandler by over seventy thousand votes.107
“Barkley’s victory stemmed from his popularity among three crucial voting blocs—farmers,
laborers and city dwellers—rather than from political coercion,” argued historian Walter L.
Hixson. His victory came from “the enduring popularity of the New Deal” and the “hundreds of
grateful constituents” he had helped during his previous times in office.108
Months later in the general election, Barkley defeated Republican candidate John P.
Haswell. Though the New Deal retained an ally with Barkley’s victory, it did not fare so well it
other elections. In the House, Republican numbers nearly doubled from 89 members to 169.
Furthermore, by historian James T. Patterson’s calculations, out of the 260 returning
congressional Democrats, 30 outright opposed the New Deal and 50 more were unenthusiastic.109
Examining this ideological purge in conjunction with growing anti-New Deal sentiment
demonstrated that Roosevelt faced a legislative branch that disfavored the growing executive
branch. This bloc of conservative Democrats and Republicans in Congress provided the support
needed to pass the Hatch Act later.
Whether or not Barkley, Chandler, or Roosevelt utilized their governmental positions to
influence the turnout of the election is unknown, though the evidence suggests both campaigns
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did.110 Moreover, when Senator M. M. Logan passed away the following year, Chandler
resigned the governorship and Keen Johnson, his successor, appointed him to the vacant Senate
seat.111 But the 1938 Senate election’s impact and importance extended beyond its electoral
outcomes. Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter Thomas L. Stokes recounted, “I travelled through the
length and breadth of the state, talking to politicians on both sides, WPA directors, WPA
workers, state officials and employees . . . I reported what I had found, which was that the WPA
was in deep politics on behalf of Senator Barkley and that Chandler’s state political leaders were
using state employees in every possible way and levying upon their salaries.”112 For Stokes, “a
much bigger and broader question was involved here than the mere election of a United States
Senator.”113
With Roosevelt’s popularity in decline in 1938, the 1938 Kentucky Democratic primary
was a referendum on the New Deal. The chance that Barkley, Roosevelt’s close ally and Senate
Majority Leader, could lose his seat drew national attention to the race. When Chandler accused
his campaign of employing WPA resources to influence the election, the entire United States
watched. Stokes’ reporting reinforced these accusations and broadcasted Barkley and Chandler’s
pernicious political activities to the entire country. The corruption charges prompted Congress to
launch a national investigation into executive interference into state elections. This inquiry
culminated in the 1939 Hatch Act, a law that restricted federal executive employees’
110
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involvement in political campaigns. Ultimately, this legislation served as the true constitutional
and legal importance of the 1938 Kentucky Democratic primary.
V. The Sheppard Committee
On May 27, 1938, the Senate adopted Senate Resolution 283 which authorized the
Special Committee to Investigate Senatorial Campaign Expenditures and Use of Governmental
Funds. This resolution authorized the committee to investigate campaign expenditures for
Senate candidates of both parties, the persons or corporations making the contributions, the
method of the campaign expenditures, and all facts related to the promise or patronage of
political funds. Later, on June 16, Senate Resolution 290 enlarged the committee’s authority to
investigate whether a federal or state appropriation had been used to influence votes in primaries
or general elections. Vice President John Nance Garner appointed Senator Morris Sheppard (DTX) to head the investigation, dubbing the body the “Sheppard Committee.” Other members of
the committee included Senator Joseph C. O’Mahoney (D-WY), Senator David I. Walsh (DMA), Senator Pat Harrison (D-MS), and Senator Wallace H. White, Jr. (R-ME).114
At the first committee meeting, the members established a statement of intent. “The
objective is simple and clear—the maintenance of the integrity of the elective processes, the
preservation of democracy at its most vital point—the ballot box, the free exercise of the voting
franchise, and to that end the prevention of any improper use of money and of any coercion or
intimidation by any person, group, or agency, outside or inside the Government,” they
declared.115
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Over the course of its existence, the committee heard hundreds of complaints related to
political activity resulting in 119 field investigations across the country. Out of these
investigations, six were in Kentucky. The investigation inspected claims against both campaigns.
Though they found neither candidate culpable for the involvement, they did discover that
political corruption did occur during the primary. Addressing nearly twenty charges in
Kentucky, the report read, “These activities, so far as solicitations were concerned, were carried
on mainly by private parties, not connected with WPA, but in some instances by WPA
officials.”116 For Barkley, they charged, “The Committee has found nothing to show that
Senator Barkley had any knowledge of any activity by persons soliciting contributions from
Federal employees in his behalf, or of political activity within the ranks of WPA personnel in his
interests. The Committee finds, therefore, no ground upon which to recommend any challenge
to the right of Senator Barkley to the Senate seat to which he has been elected.”117 Likewise,
with Chandler, the committee found inappropriate behavior, but did not link these irregularities
to the candidate himself. “The Committee also finds that State employees, whose salaries were
derived in part from United States Treasury funds, were solicited for contributions in behalf of
Candidate Chandler, and that this solicitation was done in such a manner as to amount to
intimidation and coercion,” they alleged, “The evidence before the Committee fails to show that
Governor Chandler had any knowledge of this activity.”118
Though the committee’s report exonerated both Barkley and Chandler personally, their
campaigns were not spared. Comparing the Senate report to his own findings, Stokes noted,
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“The final report revealed a far more extensive political use of WPA than I had disclosed,
including collection of several thousand dollars from WPA employees, and it showed that the
Chandler forces had collected some $70,000 from state-highway employees of federal and joint
federal-state agencies.”119 From the newspapers to Congress, the general sentiment held that
foul play had tainted the 1938 Kentucky Democratic Primary.
Furthermore, the Sheppard Committee’s investigation revealed similar instances of
political activity in other electoral contests across the country. In Pennsylvania, Democratic
Senator Joseph Guffey utilized WPA resources to back candidates for the state’s senatorial and
gubernatorial primaries. While the Sheppard Committee connected no corruption charges to
Guffey, they discovered numerous cases where WPA workers solicited funds for these
Democratic candidates.120 Similarly, Tennessee political boss Edward H. Crump and Senator
Kenneth McKellar also used WPA funds to buy votes, but the Sheppard Committee found no
substantive proof of these accusations.121
Later in the committee’s report, the senators made a legislative recommendation to
prevent future political corruption in elections. “The committee recommends legislation
prohibiting contributions for any political purpose whatsoever by any person who is the
beneficiary of Federal relief funds or who is engaged in the administration of relief laws of the
Federal Government,” they prescribed, “The committee also recommends legislation prohibiting
any person engaged in the administration of Federal relief laws from using his official authority
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or influence to coerce the political action of any person or body.”122 The following year, the
Hatch Act of 1939 fulfilled this suggestion.
VI. The Hatch Act’s Passage
On January 5, 1939, the same day Roosevelt delivered his annual budget message, he
gave a separate message to Congress emphasizing the WPA’s specific financial needs. Stressing
that foreign affairs and a recent hurricane in New England had increased demand for WPA
projects, the president claimed that “the funds now available are barely sufficient to finance the
Works Progress Administration through the month of January.”123 Along with this appropriation
request, Roosevelt recognized the growing fear that the administration used WPA funds for
political manipulation. To address these concerns, Roosevelt urged Congress to “make this
question the subject of study and hearings,” but Congress should not transfer WPA oversight and
control to local governmental boards. “It is my belief that improper political practices can be
eliminated only by the imposition of rigid statutory regulations and penalties by the Congress,”
he proclaimed, “Such penalties should be imposed not only upon persons within the
administrative organization of the Works Progress Administration, but also upon outsiders who
in fact in many instances been the principal offenders in this regard.” He closed this message
with a concession that any rules imposed on WPA workers should not deprive them of the “civil
rights to which they are entitled in common with other citizens.” 124
The Hatch Act was the legislative response crafted in response to the Sheppard
Committee’s findings. The law derived its name from Senator Carl Hatch, a Democrat from
New Mexico. Hatch’s home state had faced political corruption throughout the 1930s. In
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October 1938, the month prior to the general elections, an Albuquerque investigation found that
seventy-three WPA employees had engaged in political activities. In New Mexico, Governor
Clyde Tingley and Senator Dennis Chavez (D-NM) maintained control of a political faction that
dominated state politics.125 Given this political machine, it was clear that Senator Hatch had his
own incentives for proposing his namesake bill, but the Sheppard Committee’s findings
On March 20, 1939, Senators Hatch, Sheppard, and Warren Austin (R-VT) introduced
Senate bill 1871 to prevent pernicious political activities to the Senate’s Committee on Privileges
and Elections. In this committee, the bill received numerous amendments, specifically, removing
sections that related to governed state officials and primary elections126 Senator Tom Connally

David Porter, “Senator Carl Hatch and the Hatch Act of 1939,” New Mexico Historical
Review (April 1973), 151-161.
125

126

United States Congressional Record, 76th Congress, 1st Session, 1939, vol. 84, part 4, p. 4191.
The first amendment removed the original section 2, which read: “It shall be unlawful for any
person to intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or to attempt to intimidate, threaten or coerce, any other
person for the purpose for interfering with the right of such other person to vote, or to vote as he
may choose, or of causing such other person to vote for or not vote for any candidate for the
nomination of any party as its candidate for the office of President, Vice President, Presidential
elector, Member of the Senate, or Member of the House of Representatives at any primary or
nominating convention held solely or in part for the purpose of selecting the candidate of such
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(D-TX) asked Hatch, “Is it not true that all the provisions relating to primary elections were
eliminated?” Senator Hatch responded, “Unfortunately, in my opinion, that is true.”127 On the
Senate floor, the bill passed unanimously on April 13. Looking at the most controversial
segment, the original section 9 (a) read:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed in any administrative or supervisory
capacity by an agency of the Federal Government, whose compensation, or any part
thereof, is paid from funds authorized or appropriated by any act of Congress, to use his
official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or of
affecting the results thereof. All such persons hold opinions on all political subjects, but
they shall take no active part in political management or in political campaigns.
This definition was so broad that it effectively applied to both the president and vice-president.
Though Hatch recognized this fault, the bill continued to the House of Representative’s
Committee on the Judiciary on April 20.128
The bill remained in committee until late June. According to Hatch, the members of the
Committee on the Judiciary applauded the bill’s sentiment, but feared section 9 was too broad.
Therefore, Hatch proposed an amendment to the bill excluding “policy-making positions,”
meaning the president and vice-president, from the restrictions.129 He was so adamant on the
importance of the bill that, if necessary, he would attach it as an amendment to the upcoming
appropriation bill. On June 26, Hatch made a radio address to his home state discussing the bill.
After citing previous Democratic Party platforms aimed at reforming the civil service, he stated:
We who have sponsored this bill do not hope to correct all the evils which have grown up
over the years. We do hope to make some start toward bringing about these greatly
needed reforms.
In doing so no thought has been given to the effect on any particular election or
the ambitions or hopes of any individual, and certainly not of any party. If there are those
who profess to see any political significance or maneuvering in the bill, let me say for the
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authors of the bill, those persons are mistaken. No such maneuvering exists. My
coauthors, the Senator from Texas [Mr. Sheppard], a man long and favorably known in
public life, is a loyal Democrat, devoted to the principles of his party and an ardent
supporter in all of its campaigns. The Senator from Vermont [Mr. Austin] is a
Republican, an honorable gentleman and a patriotic statesman. The three of us have
sought to avoid partisan consideration; we have tried to work for what we conceive to be
the welfare of America and her people.
The founders of this Republic never dreamed that the spoils system would be
fastened on the Government structure.130
When the bill left the House Committee on the Judiciary, they had removed the final
sentence of the provision, which stipulated that federal executive employees could not involve
themselves on political campaigns. Upon hearing this news, Senator Hatch warned, “The issue
cannot be met by any claim of defective language, hiding behind so-called imperfections of
language cannot excuse or justify the emasculation of the measure . . . Shall Federal employees
be permitted to engage in political activities? Shall they continue to control and dominate
conventions? This, Mr. President, is the issue. It is definitely drawn. If the objectives are to be
killed, let them die honorably. Let not faith in the purposes of section 9 be betrayed by objection
to form of language or structure of words.”131
Debate on the House floor began on July 20 with House Resolution 251, which
committed the institution to debating the bill. Representative Claude Parsons (D-IL) attested,
“Since this House is about to witness the demise of the political parties in this country, I think a
quorum should be present at the embalming.”132 He then asked that a quorum be present for the
bill’s discussion. Once the Speaker confirmed quorum, Representative John J. Dempsey (DNM) affirmed the Senate’s confusion with Section 9. He proposed an amendment to the bill,
turning section 9 into its iteration. This clause stipulated:
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It shall be unlawful for any person employed in the executive branch of the Federal
Government, or any agency or department thereof, to use his official authority or
influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or affecting the result thereof.
No officer or employee in the executive branch of the Federal Government or agency or
department thereof, shall take any active part in political management or in political
campaigns. All such persons shall retain the right to vote as they may choose and to
express their opinions on all political subjects.133

Debate in the House focused exclusively on this amendment; the members all agreed on
the bills earlier sections against coercion. During this debate, representatives on both sides of the
issue supported their positions with a number of arguments. Where some legislators argued the
bill protected federal employees from intimidation, others argued it infringed upon their civil
liberties by restricting their ability to participate in political campaigns. Aside from the liberty
argument, legislators centered their speeches on the preservation of the constitutional system in
the United States.
As the first legislator to speak against the bill, Representative Emmanuel Celler (D-NY)
based his opposition on its potential effects on the Democratic Party. He stated, “Personally, it
makes no difference to me as far as my district is concerned. My election does not depend upon
Federal patronage job holders. But I believe the bill hurts my party. It goes too far.” Bearing
these remarks in mind, it is noteworthy to mention that Celler made the only argument grounded
on the bill’s partisan effects. He elaborated:
No member of the Cabinet could make a political speech. No member of the Cabinet
could help shape party doctrine, yet ours is a party system. Somebody must appear on
the radio and on the public platform to help create the party platforms and direct party
policies. It is only due to our bipartisan system that we have been enabled to make the
progress we have been making all these years, one party checking upon the other. These
sections fly in the face of those theories and would make impossible, utterly impossible,
the appearance before the public on the radio or on the platform of anyone who has a
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semblance of public office, to announce what he thinks should be the principles and the
practices of a party.134
Agreeing, Representative Harry P. Beam (D-IL) based his resistance on the bill’s impact
on federalism. “Is it not rather inconsistent . . . under the limitation our power of legislative
enactment we can prescribe only limitations on a Federal election?” he contended, “These same
Federal workers may engage actively and politically in any way they want in any local
legislative or municipal campaign. Therefore, the inconsistency and the absurdity of this
provision is apparent to me or to anyone here.”135
Taking Beam’s federal conclusion a step further, Representative Edward W. Creal (DKY) tied in the threat of totalitarianism. “You have heard a great deal of talk here about
dictatorship and Hiterlism, but today you are proposing to reach out to millions of people who
have never been sought to be touched by the Federal Government in the last 150 years and to gag
them and handcuff them in the exercise of their political rights,” he contended, “This bill not
only goes further than covering relief workers—and you can make that fence as stout as you
please and I will support it—but you go into numerous other fields which I cannot support . . . it
is the greatest invasion of States’ rights ever proposed in a quarter of a century.”136 For Creal,
the gross extension of federal authority written into the Hatch Act resembled a totalitarian power
grab.
Creal was not the only legislator to draw this comparison. Others viewed Section 9(a)’s
campaign restrictions as a clear violation of constitutional rights. Quoting President Abraham
Lincoln, Representative Sam Hobbs (D-AL) claimed “If you do this thing, you not only violate
the Constitution, you not only violate every natural right of every citizen in the United States, but
134
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by doing this you divest him of citizenship and you have set up the process of disintegration,
whereby the Government ‘of the people, by the people, and for the people’ will have begun to
perish from the earth.”137 Representative Charles Faddis (D-PA) buttressed the argument by
emphasizing the foreign-ness of this restriction on civil liberties. He reiterated, “It is a doctrine
too un-American for me to follow. To be willing to write a law saying to the employees of the
Federal Government: ‘You are holding a Federal job, you shall not participate in political
activity’ is the beginning of an invasion of civil liberties of the American people.”138
But, no representative went as far as Representative Frank Hook (D-MI), who argued that
the Hatch Act did not prevent totalitarianism or dictatorship, but caused it. He argued:
The provisions of this bill will take away from the American people that inherent right
that was handed down to them by our founding fathers, sanctified by the blood of
American patriots. If enacted into law, it will deprive the American people of the rights to
express their opinion on Government, the right to take part in politics, and is beyond a
doubt the furthest step that has been taken in the history of this Nation toward a
dictatorship. This Nation was born in politics. Through politics it has advanced to the
highest state of civilization known to man. Might I be so bold as to say to you who are
about to destroy our democracy that as long as you have Republicans and as long as you
have Democrats you will have neither communism nor fascism. But when you eliminate
politics from government you will eliminate parties. When you eliminate political
parties, you have set up a totalitarian dictatorship in the in the pace of the greatest
Government on this earth, and God forbid that that should ever happen . . .
The majority party should carry on in the interest of good government and in the
interest of the great mass of people, protecting our democratic rights under the
Constitution of the United States and not take away those rights from the people.
Moving to the legislators who championed the bill, they employed similar rhetoric in
their floor speeches. While the opposition voiced their concerns against totalitarianism, the
supporters voiced their concerns against a national spoils system. Representative Edward H.
Rees (R-KS) fervently believed the welfare and administrative state was to blame for the United
States’ social ills. “If the billions of dollars that have been appropriated by Congress for the
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needy and underprivileged during the past few years had been efficiently and economically
administered and distributed we would not have the suffering which exists throughout our
country today,” he lamented. By passing the Hatch Act, Congress still had hope “to prevent the
American Government from being controlled by the corruption of a spoils system.” 139
Though he maintained reservations about Section 9(a) Representative J. Will Taylor (RTN) directly linked the need for the Hatch Act with the previous election cycle’s WPA
corruption scandals. “Only last week . . . a WPA superintendent was tried and convicted in the
Federal court at Knoxville, Tennessee, in my congressional district, for misappropriation of
WPA funds, and for levying political tribute on poor, unfortunate relief workers . . . Even
destitute women on sewing projects on sewing projects were subjected to the impositions of
these political vultures,” Taylor asserted. He continued:
It will be urged by some that this legislation will interfere with personal liberty. Well, if
the passage of this measure will secure those on Government relief from becoming the
prey of political parasites and hijackers by interfering with their ‘liberty’ to coerce and
exploit, then that is the strongest possible argument for its speedy enactment . . .
To me the lowest form of animal life is the creature who would levy tribute,
political or otherwise, on the unfortunate recipients of Government relief, or who would
undertake to influence their political action by either a promise of favor or by a threat of
punishment or reprisal. Such a creature, in my opinion, belongs to the category of ghouls
and deserves the contempt and execration of all decent people . . .
I favor this bill as it passed the Senate. The more teeth that can be put into it the
better, so far as I am concerned. I want to see the House bill amended in substantial
conformity to the Senate bill. Some clarification may be necessary, but we all fully
realize that the objective of this legislation is to free those on Government relief from the
talons of political harpies and to probity Government employees from engaging in
pernicious political activities on Government time and at Government expense.
Aside from their fear of a spoils system, these supporters also backed the bill to preserve
free and fair elections in the United States. Representative John Robinson (R-KY) based his
position on the “common knowledge” that the “taxpayers’ money appropriated for WPA was
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used to coerce and intimidate needy men, women and children.” For him, the bill would “go far
toward bringing about clean government in the Nation” for there was nothing “so important to a
free people as to have honest, clean, and free elections.”140
Concurring, Representative Hamilton Fish (R-NY) viewed the bill as “preserving a free
ballot.” He expounded, “Our free institutions today by a free people under a free ballot is being
attacked more than ever. Our very form parliamentary and representative government is more
under attack than ever before. We are told from abroad that popular government and democracy
have failed. Unless we pass legislation of this kind, upholding a free ballot and our free
institutions and thereby our representative form of government, then gentleman, it is the
beginning of free institutions, and you will soon have some form of dictatorial government in
this country.”141 Creal, Faddis, and Hook had utilized the fear of dictatorial ambition to argue in
the negative for the bill. Here, Fish employed that same trepidation to argue in the affirmative.
Taking a different approach, Representative Raymond S. Springer (R-IN), interpreted this
bill from the viewpoint of a WPA worker. He asserted that its protections unified the American
electorate by ensuring that all individuals were free from coercion. He stated, “Can it be that we
should continue to have two distinct class of citizens on election day? The one class would be
composed of those people who are not on relief in any form, who would have the perfect right to
go to the polls and cast their vote as they may desire . . . And, the other class would consist of the
poor and unfortunate people—those who are forced to work on the WPA and those who are
drawing direct relief—who would be subject to force, threats, restraint, and intimidation . . .
whose freedom at the ballot box would have been taken away.”142
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After this extensive discussion, the time for debate expired. Moving along with the
legislative procedure, the bill passed the House with a clear majority (the final vote being 241134).143 The bill the returned to the Senate with its amendments on July 21. With little
discussion, the Senate agreed to the House changes.144
On August 2, 1939, Roosevelt signed the Hatch Act into law, but not without repeating a
few reservations that Congress had held. While he viewed the law as “an effective instrument of
good Government,” he also warned that it “cannot properly preclude Government employees
from the exercise of the right of free speech or from their right to exercise the franchise.”145
Roosevelt’s reservations demonstrated that apprehension extended beyond the legislative
branch.146
VII. The Hatch Act’s Subsequent History
Deliberations on governmental employee political involvement did not end with the
Hatch Act of 1939. Addressing previous concerns, the following year, Congress passed
subsequent legislation extending the act to the state and local level.147 In 1942, Congress
loosened the law’s restriction to exempt school teachers from Section 9(a).148 Later, in 1950,
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they lessened the penalty for violating the Hatch Act listed in section 9(b). This amendment
meant an employee found guilty would not necessarily be removed from their position.149
Given the fierce constitutional debate that had occurred on the House floor in 1939, it
was no surprise that Section 9(a) came before the Supreme Court in 1946 in United Public
Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell (1946).150 Harry B. Mitchell, president of the United
States Civil Commission, filed a Hatch Act claim against a George Poole, a Philadelphia mint
worker, for working as a Democratic poll worker on election day.151 Poole challenged his
removal on the grounds that the Hatch Act unconstitutionally restricted his freedom of speech.
In a 4-3 decision, Associate Justice Stanley Reed found no discrepancy between the Hatch Act
and the First Amendment, upholding the firing.152
However, Associate Justice Hugo Black’s dissenting opinion echoed the libertarian cries
of the legislators in 1939. Referring to Section 9(a), he wrote:
Our political system, different from many others, rests on the foundation of a belief in
rule by the people—not some, but all the people. Education has been fostered better to fit
people for self-expression and good citizenship. In a country whose people elect their
leaders and decide great public issues, the voice of none should be suppressed—at least,
such is the assumption of the First Amendment. That Amendment, unless I
misunderstand its meanings, includes a command that the Government must, in order to
promote its own interest, leave the people at liberty to speak their own thoughts about
government, advocate their own favored governmental causes, and work for their own
political candidates and parties.
The section of the Act here valid reduces the constitutionally protected liberty of
several million citizens to less than a shadow of its substance. It relegates millions of
federal, state, and municipal employees to the role of mere spectators of events upon
which hinge the safety and welfare of all the people including public employees. It
removes a sizable proportion of our electorate from full participation in affairs destined to
mould the fortunes of the nation. It makes honest participation in essential political
activities an offense punishable by proscription from public employment. It endows a
governmental board with the awesome power to censor the thoughts, expressions, and
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activities of law-abiding citizens in the field of free expression, from which no person
should be barred by a government which boasts that it is a government of, for, and by the
people—all the people. Laudable as its purpose may be, it seems to me to hack at the
roots of a Government by the people themselves, and, consequently, I cannot agree to
sustain its validity.153

Without using the exact words, Justice Black also believed the law desecrated the values
fundamental to American governance. The Hatch Act certainly did not “censor the thoughts,
expressions, and activities” of government employees, but this exaggeration emphasized liberty’s
fragility. If the federal government allowed one such infringement, it created legal precedent for
future infringements.
In the 1967, towards the end of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society (another
legislative program that greatly expanded the federal government’s scope), the Commission on
Political Activity of Government Personnel, also known as the Hatch Act Commission, reviewed
the law in order to make reform recommendations. The committee advised that Congress amend
the Hatch Act to give government employees some process to participate in political campaigns
without losing their job. Nonetheless, Congress failed to take any action based on the
Commission’s considerations. 154
Section 9(a) reappeared before the Court in United States Civil Service Commission Et
Al. v. National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, Et Al. (1973)155 In a 6-3 decision, like
Mitchell, the Court upheld the provision. In his majority opinion, Justice Byron White employed
historical examples to buttress the law’s constitutionality. He wrote:
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Our judgement is that neither First Amendment nor any other provision of the
Constitution invalidates a law barring this kind of partisan political conduct by federal
employees. Such decision on our part would no more than confirm the judgement of
history, a judgement made by this country over the last century that it is in the best
interest of the country, indeed essential, that federal service should depend upon
meritorious performance rather than political service, and that the political influence of
federal employees on others and on the electoral process should be limited . . .
Early in our history, Thomas Jefferson was disturbed by the political activities of
some of those in Executive Branch of the Government . . .
The experience of the intervening years, particularly that of the 1936 and 1938
political campaigns, convinced a majority in Congress that the prohibition against taking
an active part in political management and poetical campaigns should be extended to the
entire federal service . . .
It seems fundamental in the first place that employees in the Executive Branch of
the Government, or those working for any of its agencies, should administer the law in
accordance with the will of Congress, rather than in accordance with their own or the will
of a political party. They are expected to enforce the law and execute the programs of the
Government without bias or favoritism for or against any political party or group or the
members thereof. A major thesis of the Hatch Act is that to serve this great end of
Government -- the impartial execution of the laws -- it is essential that federal employees,
for example, not take formal positions in political parties, not undertake to play
substantial roles in partisan political campaigns, and not run for office on partisan
political tickets. Forbidding activities like these will reduce the hazards to fair and
effective government.156
Justice White’s defense mirrored the Republican position in the original House floor
debates. Because their employment tasked them with executing the law, it required them to
remain publicly neutral.
But like Justice Black’s opinion three decades before, Associate Justice William Douglas,
joined by Associate Justices William J. Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, dissented against
Section 9 (a). He posited:
We deal here with a First Amendment right to speak, to propose, to publish, to petition
Government, to assemble. Time and place are obvious limitations. Thus, no one could
object if public employees were barred from using office time to engage in outside
activities, whether political or otherwise. But it is of no concern of Government what an
employee does in his spare time, whether religion, recreation, social work, or politics is
his hobby—unless what he does impairs efficiency or other facets of the merits of his job.
156
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Some things, some activities do affect or may be thought to affect the employee’s job
performance. But his political creed, like his religion, is irrelevant. In the areas of
speech, like religion, it is of no concern what the employee says in private to his wife or
in to the public in Constitution Hall. If Government employment were only a ‘privilege,’
then all sorts of conditions might be attached.157
Similar to Justice Black, he also argued a slippery slope. By preventing federal
employees from actively engaging with political campaigns, it opened the door for “all sorts of
conditions.” In conjunction, the two dissents from Justices Black and Douglas illustrated two
points. First, the civil liberty argument remained valid on a legal level; two of the nation’s top
jurists agreed with the congressional legislators in that it violated crucial American rights.
Second, they reiterated the notion that the Hatch Act had severe repercussions for governance
beyond that of the federal workers.
Since Civil Service Commission, no major challenges to the Hatch Act have occurred.
The Hatch Act has had an important place in the legal regulation of the executive branch across
the twentieth century. Despite Supreme Court challenges and political pushes, the law still
defines how federal, state, and local government employees engage with political campaigns.158
VIII. Why was the Hatch Act Passed?
The Hatch Act continues to have a lasting impact on the twentieth and twenty-first
century. Given the law’s permanence and contested constitutionality, it becomes important to
understand why Congress passed the law. This section analyzes the Hatch Act’s passage on
partisan and constitutional grounds. Though House Republicans only voted in favor of the bill, it
was a bipartisan measure; Democrats like Senator Hatch had introduced the bill and voted for it
in both chambers. Bearing this point in mind, one must look elsewhere to explain why the Hatch
Act passed Congress. Instead, the evidence suggests that the WPA controversies, like the one in
157
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Kentucky, evoked ideological concerns about the corruption of the constitutional system. In all
three branches of the federal government, the Hatch Act debate surpassed a discussion of
political activities in work relief to a conversation on the powers and role of the national
government.
Given that the New Deal and the WPA were part of the Democratic agenda, it would
make sense for the Republican Party to support legislation restricting federal agency reach. This
consideration was more plausible considering the WPA scandals; if the Democratic Party was
willing to use this agency to purge its own party members in primaries, then Republicans would
have an electoral incentive to protect their own prospects. But for most of the 1930s, the
Democratic Party retained control of both the presidency and Congress. Republicans would not
regain the presidency until 1952 with the election of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, nor would
they regain Congress until 1947. The Republican Party did not have the votes in Congress to
pass the law without Democratic assistance. Moreover, the threshold would be higher when
considering the possibility of presidential veto.
As Representative Celler noted in the congressional debate, “Both the Democrats and
Republicans on the committee fashioned this bill.”159 Looking at its origins in the Senate, a
Democratic senator introduced the bill which unanimously passed the Democrat-dominated
floor. In the House, both Democrats and Republicans voted for the bill. Interestingly, only
Democrats voted against the bill; Republicans either voted in favor of the Hatch Act or did note
vote at all.160 When it reached the White House, Roosevelt even signed the bill without enacting
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a veto. While this action may have been necessary to avoid further criticism after the 1938
“purges,” it revealed that he did not deem it too threatening to the Democratic Party.
From its inception, the Hatch Act was a bipartisan bill. Congressional Republicans may
have backed the bill because for its potential electoral effects, but this point does not provide a
full account of the its passage. A complete explanation must then consider a separate factor,
something that transcended party boundaries.
Examining the congressional debates covering the Hatch Act, one finds an interesting
paradigm. In the House, members centered their debates around civil liberties and the fear of
totalitarianism in America. On the one hand, some legislators felt the Hatch Act would serve as
a legislative protection against the creation of a national political machine sustained by work
relief agencies and a new spoils system. On the other hand, other legislators argued that the
Hatch Act created a slippery slope; if the government restricted these federal workers’ civil
liberties, it would take the executive branch down the road to totalitarianism.
This conversation lead to the constitutional aspect of the Hatch Act debate: that without
it, an all-encompassing executive branch of the federal government would use agencies like the
WPA to manipulate elections and violate civil liberties. While executive agencies existed prior
to the New Deal, legal historian Lawrence M. Friedman wrote, “it was a dramatic quickening, a
ratcheting upward, that pushed the boundaries further and further into a kind of beyond.” In
reference to these new agencies, Friedman argued, “They raised the specter of dictatorships; of
an all-powerful administrative state, a central-planning state, in which the little man would be
crushed into dust.”161 Local WPA scandals in Kentucky and other states triggered this latent fear
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of dictatorial totalitarianism and provided enough cause for Congress to act in a bipartisan
manner by enacting a law covering all federal employees.
To clarify, this apprehension existed outside the context of the Hatch Act debate.
Congressman Charles Halleck (R-IN), who became House majority leader after WWII, voted for
New Deal financial reforms such as Social Security, the Securities Exchange Commission, and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, but opposed the expansive administrative state that it
had ushered in. He once proclaimed, “Free Americans then will be following the road to
serfdom under rigid governmental controls in every department of their lives . . . debt is slavery .
. . excessive taxes is slavery . . . bureaucracy is slavery.”162
Similarly, using Fargo, North Dakota, as a case study, historian David B. Danbom
discovered that average Americans were not entirely receptive to the New Deal’s top-down
governance, specifically with respects to the WPA’s employment measures.163 “Traditional
assumptions and values continued to be held and asserted—sometimes quite aggressively when
challenged by federal programs based on very different assumptions and values,” Danbom
concluded, “New Deal programs were contested not just in Washington by Congressional
conservatives and populist demagogues who opposed their creation, but in cities, states and
counties where local officials who challenged their implementation.”164
In the larger historical context, a comparison of the New Deal’s executive enlargement to
totalitarianism stemmed from international circumstances. When the global market toppled in
1929, European states like Germany and Italy passed broad Enabling Acts, granting near
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unlimited power to their heads of state. Over the following years, these powers regained
economic balance before the United States and other democracies, questioning whether liberal
constitutionalism was sustainable. In his recent award-winning work, Ira Katznelson stated,
“The crisis of liberal democracy in Europe, Latin America, and East Asia in short, generated
widespread apprehension about democratic incapacity as Franklin Roosevelt was about to
assume the presidency. As he and the country faced a night sky illuminated by barbarism in
1933, they confronted confounding and pressing uncertainties. Could the political system meet
its most urgent tests without suspending its rule? Might it be necessary to fashion a crisis
government and transcend the limits of ordinary procedures in order to confront the economic
crisis, respond to the dictators, and rescue the system?”165
Initially, Roosevelt’s rhetoric bordered on similar action. In his inaugural address, on
March 4, 1933, he announced, “I shall ask the Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet
the crisis—broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power
that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.”166 Despite this vague
language, Roosevelt never crossed into dictatorial territory. However, Katznelson observed that
the executive branch drafted most New Deal legislation, expedited it through an abbreviated
legislative process, and expanded its power through new agencies.167 In light of these deviations,
Katznelson found that later in the 1930s, “Congress firmly established itself as a forum where
detailed answers could be crafted to the main substantive challenges of a historically dense and
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difficult era . . . In that painful and uneven process, the legislature was recast and reinvigorated
as a site of decision and governance.”168
Historian Barry D. Karl’s work reiterated this point. “The congressional rebellion against
the WPA reflects an even more profound effect of New Deal politics. The fear of bureaucracy,
of intellectuals managing government, and now of the very concept of government planning was
no longer confined to a conservative minority,” argued Karl.169 He continued, “Roosevelt’s first
plan for his second term had failed badly . . . The plan . . . had fallen victim to two historical
fears. One was the fear that identified rationalization with dictatorship and fascism. The other
was the fear that rationalization would destroy state and local control of the federal government’s
power to distribute federal resources.”170 But while Roosevelt never crossed the line into
dictatorship, Congress responded preemptively with the Hatch Act.
IX. Conclusion: The Hatch Act’s Importance in Relation to New Deal Legal and Constitutional
History
Examination of the Hatch Act’s origins illuminates a gap in United States constitutional
and legal history: the New Deal after 1937. Most general New Deal histories, from Schlesinger
to Kennedy, shifted their attention from the New Deal’s domestic policies towards international
affairs after the 1937 “court-packing” fight and the 1938 election “purges.” Legal and
constitutional histories replicated this trend. Though the New Deal’s administrative state
remained into the twenty-first century, these historians dedicated little attention to the legislative
side of its origins, focusing instead on the Supreme Court.
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On this note, Karl wrote on the Roosevelt administration’s legislative achievements and
failures after 1937 in what he calls the “Third New Deal.” This classification builds upon a
preexisting trend in New Deal historiography where historians divide the program into two
halves. The first half, lasting from Roosevelt’s inauguration in 1933 to “Black Monday” in
1935, focused on economic recovery through laws like the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the
National Industrial Recovery Act. The second half, lasting from 1935 until the 1937 “courtpacking” scheme, consisted more of reform measures like the Wagner Act and Social Security.
Karl contended that the existing scholarship failed to consider legislation after 1937 but before
the United States joined World War II. Compared to Degler’s description of the New Deal as the
“Third American Revolution,” Karl called these years the Thermidorian reaction to these liberal
expansions.171
To expand upon Karl’s point, from 1933 to 1937, the federal government expanded at an
unprecedented rate with the creation of the administrative and welfare states. From 1937 to
1940, however, Congress reigned in those liberal policies. The Hatch Act was only one law to
perform this function. The few domestic victories that Roosevelt achieved, like the National
Housing Act of 1937 and the Revenue Act of 1937, were offset by defeats like the Revenue Act
of 1938, which reversed the progressive tax plan of the previous year, and the creation of the
House Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities, which investigated suspected fascists
and communists in those newly created agencies. As late as 1946, the Administrative Procedure
Act established strict guidelines for administrative agency processes, determining what
regulations they had the authority to impose.172
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Legal histories focusing on the “constitutional revolution of 1937” overlooked this final
phase. After the New Deal’s victory with the “switch in time that saves nine,” authors like Barry
Cushman and G. Edward White skipped to the Court’s broad reinterpretation of the Commerce
Clause in Wickard v. Filburn.173 While the Court was more hospitable to the New Deal after
1937, other dimensions of the legal realm were not. To skip this legislation is to ascribe to the
New Deal an incorrect historical legacy. Congress did not unquestionably accept every policy the
executive branch requested. As time progressed, Roosevelt faced numerous setbacks and
retaliations against his hallmark agenda, like the Hatch Act of 1939. In the words of scholar
Maxwell Bloomfield, if the New Deal was a constitutional “peaceful revolution,” federal
employees’ right to participate in political campaigns was one of the few victims in that
upheaval.174
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Appendix I- The Original Text of the 1939 Hatch Act- 53 Stat. 1147.175
An Act
To prevent pernicious political activities.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That it shall be unlawful for any person to intimidate, threaten,
or coerce, or to attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce, any other person for the purpose of
interfering with the right of such other person to vote or not vote as he may choose, or of causing
such other person to vote for, or not to vote for, any candidate for the office of President, Vice
President, Presidential elector, Member of the Senate, or Member of the House of
Representatives at any election held solely or in part for the purpose of selecting President, a
Vice President, a Presidential elector, or any Member of the Senate or any Member of the House
of Representatives, Delegates or Commissioners from the Territories and insular possessions.
Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person employed in any administrative position by the
United States, or by any department, independent agency, or other agency of the United States
(including any corporation controlled by the United States or any agency thereof, and any
corporation all of the capital stock of which is owned by the United States or any agency
thereof), to use his official authority for the purpose of interfering with, or affecting the election
or the nomination of any candidate for the office of President, Vice President, Presidential
elector, Member of the Senate, or Member of the House of Representatives, Delegates or
Commissioners from the Territories and insular possessions.
Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to promise any
employment, position, work, compensation, or other benefit, provided for or made possible in
whole or in part by any Act any political activity or for the support of or opposition to any
candidate or any political party in any election.
Sec. 4. Except as may required by the provisions of subsection (b), section 9 of this Act,
it shall be unlawful for any person to deprive, attempt to deprive, or threaten to deprive, by any
means, any person of any employment, work, compensation, or other benefit provided for or
made possible by any Act of Congress appropriating funds for work relief or relief purposes, on
account of race, creed, color, or any political activity, support of, or opposition to any candidate
or any political party in any election.
Sec. 5. It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or receive or be in any manner
concerned in soliciting or receiving any assessment, subscription, or contribution for any
political purpose whatever from any person known by him to be entitled to or receiving
compensation, employment or other benefit provided for or made possible by any Act of
Congress appropriating funds for work relief or relief purposes.
Sec. 6. It shall be unlawful for any person for political purposes to furnish or to disclose,
or to aid or assist in furnishing or disclosing, any list or names of persons receiving
compensation, employment, or benefits provided for or made possible by any Act of Congress
appropriating, or authorizing the appropriation of, funds for work relief or relief purposes, to a
political candidate, committee, campaign manager, or to any person for delivery to a political
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candidate, committee, or campaign manager, and it shall be unlawful for any person to receive
any such list or names for political purposes.
Sec. 7. No part of any appropriation made by any Act, heretofore or hereafter enacted,
making appropriations for work relief, relief, or otherwise to increase employment by providing
loans and grants for public-work projects, shall be used for the purpose of, and no authority
conferred by any such Act upon any person shall be exercised or administered for the purpose of,
interfering with, restraining, or coercing nay individual in the exercise of his right to vote at any
election.
Sec. 8. Any person who violates any of the foregoing provisions of this Act upon
conviction thereof shall be find not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year,
or both.
Section 9. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person employed in the executive branch of the
Federal Government, or any agency or department thereof, to use his official authority or
influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or affecting the result thereof. No
officer or employee in the executive branch of the Federal Government, or any agency or
department thereof, shall take any active part in political management or in political campaigns.
All such persons shall retain the right to vote as they may choose and to express their opinions on
all political subjects. For the purposes of this section the term “officer” or “employee” shall not
be construed to include (1) the President and Vice President of the United States; (2) persons
whose compensation is paid from the appropriation for the office of the President; (3) heads and
assistant heads of executive departments; (4) officers who are appointed by the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and who determine policies to be pursued by the
United States in its relations with foreign powers or in the Nation-wide administration of Federal
laws.
(b) Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be immediately removed
from the position or office held by him, and thereafter no part of the funds appropriated by any
Act of Congress for such position or office shall be used to pay the compensation of such person.
Sec. 9A. (1) It shall be unlawful for any person employed in any capacity by any agency
of the Federal Government, whose compensation, or any part thereof, is paid from funds
authorized or appropriated by any Act of Congress, to have membership in any political party or
organization which advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government in the
United States.
(2) Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be immediately removed
from the position or office held by him, and thereafter no part of the funds appropriated by any
Act of Congress for such position or office shall be used to pay the compensation of such person.
Sec. 10. All provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, not in substitution for, of
existing law.
Sec. 11. If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision to any person or
circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act, and the application of such provision to
other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby.
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Yea

Alexander-R
Allen (IL)-R
Allen (LA)-D
Andersen, H. Carl-R
Anderson (MO)-D
Andresen, A.H.-R
Angell-R
Arends-R
Ashbrook-D
Austin-R
Ball-R
Barton-R
Bates (MA)-R
Beckworth-D
Bender-R
Blackney-R
Boehne-D
Bolles-R
Bolton-R
Bradley (MI)-R
Brewster-R
Brooks-D
Brown (OH)-R
Burgin-D
Byrns (TN)-D
Carlson-R
Carter-R
Cartwright-D
Case (SD)-R
Chapman-D
Chiperfield-R
Church-R
Clason-R
Claypool-D
Clevenger -R
Cochran-D
Coffee (Nebraska)-D
Cole (MD)-D
Cole (NY) -R
Colmer-D
Cooper-D

Corbett-R
Costello-D
Crawford-R
Crosser-D
Crowther-R
Culkin-R
Curtis-R
Darden-D
Darrow-R
Dempsey-D
DeRouen-D
Dirksen-R
Disney-D
Ditter-R
Dondero-R
Douglas-R
Dowell-R
Doxey-D
Drewry-D
Dworshak-R
Eaton (NJ)-R
Elston-R
Engel-R
Englebright-R
Fenton-R
Fish-R
Flannery-D
Ford, Leland-R
Fulmer-D
Gamble-R
Garrett-D
Gartner
Gathings
Gearhart
Gehrmann
Gerlach
Gilchrist
Gillie
Gore
Gossett
Graham

Grant (IN)
Grffith
Gross
Guyer (KS)
Gwynne
Hall
Halleck
Hancock
Harness
Harrington
Harter (NY)
Harter (OH)
Hartley
Hawks
Heinke
Hess
Hinshaw
Hoffman-R
Holmes-R
Hope-R
Horton-R
Houston-D
Hull-Progressive Party
Hunter-D
Jacobsen-D
Jarrett-R
Jeffries-R
Jenkins (OH)-R
Jenks (NH)-R
Jensen-R
Johns-R
Johnson (IL)-R
Johnson (IN)-R
Johnson, Luther A.-D
Johnson (OK)-D
Jones (OH)-R
Jones (TX)-D
Kean-R
Keefe-R
Kilday-D
Kinzer-R
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Kitchens-D
Kleberg-D
Knutson-R
Kunkel-R
Lambertson-R
Landis-R
Lanham-D
LeCompte-R
Lemke-Nonpartisan
Republican
Lewis (CO)-D
Lewis (OH)-R
Luce-R
Ludlow-D
McCormack-D
McDowell-R
McGehee-D
McLaughlin-D
McLean-R
McLeod-R
Maas-R
Mahon-D
Maloney-D
Mapes-R
Marshall-R
Martin (IA)-R
Martin (MA)-R
Mason-R
Michener-R
Miller-R
Mills (LA)-D
Monkiewicz-R
Monroney-D
Mott-R
Mouton-D
Mundt-R
Murray-R
Nichols-D
Norrell-D

O’Brien-R
Oliver-R
Osmers-R
Pace-D
Patton-D
Pearson-D
Pierce (NY)-R
Pittenger-R
Plumley-R
Poage-D
Polk-D
Powers-R
Ramspeck-D
Randolph-D
Rankin-D
Rayburn-D
Reece (TN)-R
Reed (IL)-R
Rees (KS)-R
Rich-R
Risk-R
Robsion (KY)-R
Rockefeller-R
Rodgers (PA)-R
Rogers (MA)-R
Routzohn-R
Rutherford-R
Sandager-R
Schafer (WI)-R
Schiffler-R
Seccombe-R
Seger-R
Shafer (MI)-R
Short-R
Simpson-R
Smith (CT)-D
Smith (IL)-D
Smith (ME)-R
South-D

Springer-R
Starnes (AL)-D
Stearns (NH)-R
Stefan-R
Sumner (IL)-R
Sutphin-D
Sweeney-D
Taber-R
Talle-R
Taylor (TN)-R
Terry-D
Thill-R
Thomas (NJ)-R
Thomas (TX)-D
Thomason-D
Tibbott-R
Tinkham-R
Treadway-R
Van Zandt-R
Voorhis (CA)-D
Vorys (OH)-R
Vreeland-R
Wadsworth-R
Walter-D
Ward-D
Welch-R
West-D
Wheat-R
Whelchel-D
White (OH)-R
Whittington-D
Wigglesworth-R
Williams (DE)-R
Winter-R
Wolcott-R
Wolverton (NJ)-R
Woodruff (MI)-R
Youngdahl-R

Nays
Arnold-D
Barden-D
Barnes-D
Barry-D
Bates (KY)-D

Beam-D
Bell-D
Bland-D
Bloom-D
Boland-D

Boykin-D
Bradley (PA)-D
Brown (GA)-D
Buck-D
Bulwinkle
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Caldwell-D
Cannon (FL)-D
Cannon (MO)-D
Casey (MA)-D
Celler-D
Chandler-D
Clark-D
Coffee (WA)-D
Collins-D
Cox-D
Creal-D
Crowe-D
Cullen-D
D’Alesandro-D
Delaney-D
Dickstein-D
Dingell-D
Doughton-D
Duncan-D
Dunn-D
Durham-D
Eberharter-D
Edmiston-D
Elliott-D
Ellis-D
Faddis-D
Fay-D
Flaherty
Flannagan
Ford, Thomas F.-D
Fries-D
Gavagan-D
Gibbs-D
Grant (AL)-D
Green-D
Gregory-D
Hart-D
Havenner- Progressive
Party
Healey-D
Hendricks-D

Present
Thorkelson-R

Hennings-D
Hill-D
Hobbs-D
Hook-D
Izac-D
Jarman-D
Johnson, Lyndon-D
Johnson, (WV)-D
Kee-D
Keller-D
Kennedy, Martin-D
Kennedy (MD)-D
Kennedy, Michael-D
Keogh-D
Kirwan-D
Kocialkowski-D
Kramer-D
Larrabee-D
Leavy-D
Lesinski-D
McAndrews-D
McArdle-D
McGranery-D
McKeough-D
McMillan, John L.-D
McMillan, Thos. S.-D
Maciejewski-D
Marcantonio- American
Labor
Martin (CO)-D
Martin (IL)-D
May-D
Merritt-D
Mills (AR)-D
Mitchell-D
Moser-D
Murdock (UT)-D
Myers-D
Nelson-D
Norton-D
O’Connor-D

O’Day-D
O’Leary-D
O’Neal-D
O’Toole-D
Parsons-D
Patrick-D
Peterson (FL)-D
Peterson (GA)-D
Pierce (OR)-D
Rabaut-D
Richards-D
Robinson (UT)-D
Rogers (OK)-D
Romjue-D
Sabath-D
Sacks-D
Satterfield-D
Schaefer (IL)-D
Schuetz-D
Scrugham
Shanley-D
Shannon-D
Sheppard-D
Sirovich-D
Smith (WA)-D
Snyder-D
Somers (NY)-D
Sparkman-D
Spence-D
Steagal-D
Tarver-D
Tenerowicz-D
Vincent (KY)-D
Vinson (GA)-D
Weaver-D
White (ID)-D
Williams (MO)-D
Wood-D
Zimmerman-D
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Not Voting
Anderson (CA)-R
Andrews-D
Boren-D
Bryson-D
Buckler (MN)-Farm Labor
Party
Buckley (NY)-D
Burch-D
Burdick- Nonpartisan
Republican
Byrne (NY)-D
Byron-D
Cluett-R
Connery-D
Cooley-D
Cummings-D
Curley-D
Dies-D

Eaton (CA)-R
Evans-D
Ferguson-D
Fernandez-D
Fitzpatrick-D
Folger-D
Ford (MS)-D
Geyer (CA)-D
Gifford-R
Hare-D
Kelly-D
Kerr-D
Lea-D
Magnuson-D
Mansfield-D
Massingale -D
Murdock (AZ)-D
Patman-D

Pfeifer-D
Reed (NY)-R
Ryan-D
Sasscer-D
Schulte-D
Schwert-D
Secrest-D
Smith (OH)-R
Smith (VA)-D
Smith (WV)-D
Sullivan-D
Sumners (TX)
Taylor (CO)-D
Tolan-D
Wallgren -D
Warren-D
Wolfenden (PA)-R
Woodrum (VA)-D

Myers 72

Appendix III- The modern Hatch Act- 5 U.S. Code Chapter 15- Political Activity of Certain
State and Local Employees
5 U.S. Code 1501- Definitions
For the purpose of this chapter—
(1)“State” means a State or territory or possession of the United States;
(2)“State or local agency” means the executive branch of a State, municipality, or other political
subdivision of a State, or an agency or department thereof, or the executive branch of the District
of Columbia, or an agency or department thereof;
(3)“Federal agency” means an Executive agency or other agency of the United States, but does
not include a member bank of the Federal Reserve System; and
(4)“State or local officer or employee” means an individual employed by a State or local agency
whose principal employment is in connection with an activity which is financed in whole or in
part by loans or grants made by the United States or a Federal agency, but does not include—
(A)an individual who exercises no functions in connection with that activity; or
(B)an individual employed by an educational or research institution, establishment,
agency, or system which is supported in whole or in part by—
(i) a State or political subdivision thereof;
(ii) the District of Columbia; or
(iii) a recognized religious, philanthropic, or cultural organization.
1502- Influencing elections; taking part in political campaigns; prohibitions; exceptions
(a) A State or local officer or employee may not—
(1) use his official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting
the result of an election or a nomination for office;
(2) directly or indirectly coerce, attempt to coerce, command, or advise a State or local
officer or employee to pay, lend, or contribute anything of value to a party, committee,
organization, agency, or person for political purposes; or
(3) if the salary of the employee is paid completely, directly or indirectly, by loans or
grants made by the United States or a Federal agency, be a candidate for elective office.
(b) A State or local officer or employee retains the right to vote as he chooses and to
express his opinions on political subjects and candidates.
(c)Subsection (a)(3) of this section does not apply to—
(1) the Governor or Lieutenant Governor of a State or an individual authorized by
law to act as Governor;
(2) the mayor of a city;
(3) a duly elected head of an executive department of a State, municipality, or the
District of Columbia who is not classified under a State, municipal, or the District
of Columbia merit or civil-service system; or
(4) an individual holding elective office.
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1503-Nonpartisan candidacies permitted
Section 1502(a)(3) of this title does not prohibit any State or local officer or employee from
being a candidate in any election if none of the candidates is to be nominated or elected at such
election as representing a party any of whose candidates for Presidential elector received votes in
the last preceding election at which Presidential electors were selected.
1504- Investigations; notice of hearing
When a Federal agency charged with the duty of making a loan or grant of funds of the United
States for use in an activity by a State or local officer or employee has reason to believe that the
officer or employee has violated section 1502 of this title, it shall report the matter to the Special
Counsel. On receipt of the report or on receipt of other information which seems to the Special
Counsel to warrant an investigation, the Special Counsel shall investigate the report and such
other information and present his findings and any charges based on such findings to the Merit
Systems Protection Board, which shall—
(1) fix a time and place for a hearing; and
(2) send, by registered or certified mail, to the officer or employee charged with the
violation and to the State or local agency employing him a notice setting forth a summary
of the alleged violation and giving the time and place of the hearing.
The hearing may not be held earlier than 10 days after the mailing of the notice.
1505- Hearings; adjudications; notice of determinations
Either the State or local officer or employee or the State or local agency employing him, or both,
are entitled to appear with counsel at the hearing under section 1504 of this title, and be heard.
After this hearing, the Merit Systems Protection Board shall—
(1) determine whether a violation of section 1502 of this title has occurred;
(2) determine whether the violation warrants the removal of the officer or employee from
his office or employment; and
(3) notify the officer or employee and the agency of the determination by registered or
certified mail.
1506- Orders; withholding loans or grants; limitations
(a)When the Merit Systems Protection Board finds—
(1) that a State or local officer or employee has not been removed from his office or
employment within 30 days after notice of a determination by the Board that he has
violated section 1502 of this title and that the violation warrants removal; or
(2) that the State or local officer or employee has been removed and has been appointed
within 18 months after his removal to an office or employment in the same State (or in
the case of the District of Columbia, in the District of Columbia) in a State or local
agency which does not receive loans or grants from a Federal agency; the Board shall
make and certify to the appropriate Federal agency an order requiring that agency to
withhold from its loans or grants to the State or local agency to which notice was given

Myers 74
an amount equal to 2 years’ pay at the rate the officer or employee was receiving at the
time of the violation. When the State or local agency to which appointment within 18
months after removal has been made is one that receives loans or grants from a Federal
agency, the Board order shall direct that the withholding be made from that State or local
agency.
(b) Notice of the order shall be sent by registered or certified mail to the State or local
agency from which the amount is ordered to be withheld. After the order becomes final, the
Federal agency to which the order is certified shall withhold the amount in accordance with the
terms of the order. Except as provided by section 1508 of this title, a determination or order of
the Board becomes final at the end of 30 days after mailing the notice of the determination or
order.
(c) The Board may not require an amount to be withheld from a loan or grant pledged by a State
or local agency as security for its bonds or notes if the withholding of that amount would
jeopardize the payment of the principal or interest on the bonds or notes.
1507- Subpoenas and depositions
(a) The Merit Systems Protection Board may require by subpoena the attendance and testimony
of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence relating to any matter before it as a
result of this chapter. Any member of the Board may sign subpoenas, and members of the Board
and its examiners when authorized by the Board may administer oaths, examine witnesses, and
receive evidence. The attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence may
be required from any place in the United States at the designated place of hearing. In case of
disobedience to a subpoena, the Board may invoke the aid of a court of the United States in
requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of documentary
evidence. In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to a person, the
United States District Court within whose jurisdiction the inquiry is carried on may issue an
order requiring him to appear before the Board, or to produce documentary evidence if so
ordered, or to give evidence concerning the matter in question; and any failure to obey the order
of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt thereof.
(b) The Board may order testimony to be taken by deposition at any stage of a proceeding or
investigation before it as a result of this chapter. Depositions may be taken before an individual
designated by the Board and having the power to administer oaths. Testimony shall be reduced to
writing by the individual taking the deposition, or under his direction, and shall be subscribed by
the deponent. Any person may be compelled to appear and depose and to produce documentary
evidence before the Board as provided by this section.
(c) A person may not be excused from attending and testifying or from producing documentary
evidence or in obedience to a subpoena on the ground that the testimony or evidence,
documentary or otherwise, required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a
penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is
compelled to testify, or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, before the Board in
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obedience to a subpoena issued by it. A person so testifying is not exempt from prosecution and
punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.
1508- Judicial Review
A party aggrieved by a determination or order of the Merit Systems Protection Board under
section 1504, 1505, or 1506 of this title may, within 30 days after the mailing of notice of the
determination or order, institute proceedings for review thereof by filing a petition in the United
States District Court for the district in which the State or local officer or employee resides. The
institution of the proceedings does not operate as a stay of the determination or order unless—
(1) the court specifically orders a stay; and
(2) the officer or employee is suspended from his office or employment while the
proceedings are pending.
A copy of the petition shall immediately be served on the Board, and thereupon the Board
shall certify and file in the court a transcript of the record on which the determination or
order was made. The court shall review the entire record including questions of fact and
questions of law. If application is made to the court for leave to adduce additional
evidence, and it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the additional evidence may
materially affect the result of the proceedings and that there were reasonable grounds for
failure to adduce this evidence in the hearing before the Board, the court may direct that
the additional evidence be taken before the Board in the manner and on the terms and
conditions fixed by the court. The Board may modify its findings of fact or its
determination or order in view of the additional evidence and shall file with the court the
modified findings, determination, or order; and the modified findings of fact, if supported
by substantial evidence, are conclusive. The court shall affirm the determination or order,
or the modified determination or order, if the court determines that it is in accordance
with law. If the court determines that the determination or order, or the modified
determination or order, is not in accordance with law, the court shall remand the
proceeding to the Board with directions either to make a determination or order
determined by the court to be lawful or to take such further proceedings as, in the opinion
of the court, the law requires. The judgment and decree of the court are final, subject to
review by the appropriate United States Court of Appeals as in other cases, and the
judgment and decree of the court of appeals are final, subject to review by the Supreme
Court of the United States on certiorari or certification as provided by section 1254 of
title 28. If a provision of this section is held to be invalid as applied to a party by a
determination or order of the Board, the determination or order becomes final and
effective as to that party as if the provision had not been enacted.
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